Notes on The Pentagon Wars

The Pentagon Wars
by Jim Burton

This is an excellent book on the culture of the Pentagon and military industrial complex in the 70s and 80s. A lot of the events and lessons in this book are applicable today. I used this book to create my “To Be or To Do” leadership lesson for the ACE course and as part of my continued study into the work of Col John Boyd. Below are the notes and key points I took from the book to help me create the lesson and case study.

Link to To Be or To Do leadership lesson: https://danielfitzgerald.dev/index.php/2021/08/16/leadership-to-be-or-to-do/

Buy the book on Amazon: https://www.amazon.com/Pentagon-Wars-Reformers-Challenge-Guard/dp/1612516009
See movie of same name – https://youtu.be/ir0FAa8P2MU
Note: Most of this is quoting or paraphrasing straight from the book.

More info on the Bradley Fighting Vehicle: https://user.eng.umd.edu/~austin/enes489p/lecture-resources/BradleyFightingVehicle-Scenario.pdf

Prologue

• Attrition warfare philosophy dominated military thinking during the Vietnam era and immediately thereafter.
• The new breed thinks in terms of feints, deceptions, multiple thrusts, and firepower to tie up the enemy while maneuvering around behind them…
• Confusion, chaos, panic, surrender, “being inside the opponent’s decision time”…
• Old thinking leaders bungled just enough to allow the majority of the elite Iraqi Republican Guard to escape a well-planned trap in the Gulf War
• Boyd has become one of the premier military theorists in the United States
• FMFM-1
• Boyd attacked Army’s 1976 edition of Field Manual 100-5, Operations
• Boyd philosophy based on maneuver rather than attrition
• Reformers goal was to change the military’s thinking about people, tactics, and strategy; the kinds of weapons the Pentagon bought; the manner in which these weapons were tested; and the budgetary decision-making process associated with buying and fielding those weapons.
• Burton wanted the Army to run some realistic tests of the BFV … The Army did not want to run those tests.
• Many lives were saved in the Gulf War due to running those tests
• John Boyd has had more influence on the military than any other single individual
• How can people in the book behave the way they are described? Occasionally .. honest disagreements .. leading to power politics. Often however because people were corrupt, incompetent, blindly ambitions, or a combo of all 3.
• Careerism is a pervasive force inside the Pentagon.
• Think about the motivation behind the actions of the people involved. Why did they do what they did?
• All too often, moral and ethical corruption, incompetence, and blind ambition, in some form, are the main culprits.

The Fighter Mafia

• In the 80s the American public gave the pentagon not only an unprecedented amount of money, but also its trust. Both the public’s money and trust were squandered.
• Regarding officers at the Pentagon: Yet, they have to be there at certain points in their careers to be competitive for the next promotion. Many sell their souls for that fitness report.
• First reformer actions: James Fallows’s “Muscle-Bound Super Power” published in The Atlantic Monthly. Charged that the US was investing in overly complex and costly weapons systems and had lost the “military art” and the ability to win.
• A few months later, Congressman Jack Edwards revealed to the public that Air Force mechanics had to spend money out of pocket to buy electronics from Radio Shack to keep the jets flying.
• Re. gripes about the pentagon: the incestuous revolving door between the defense industry and Pentagon officials
• Reformers sought a change in the mind-set of the military and civilian leadership
• “A Discourse on Winning and Losing” will go down in history as the 20th century’s most original thinking in the military arts
• When you challenge the system with unconventional ideas and behavior, the system usually reacts violently, especially when you prove it wrong and force it to change
• Boyd had been sent to clean out Spray … Spray immediately recognized the power of the theories and techniques. They were immediately drawn together by common beliefs
• Design discussion: Was it really necessary for the F-15 to have a top speed of 2.5 the speed of sound? Most air combat occurred at subsonic speed and 0 air combat has occurred above 1.5 times the speed of sound.
• A serious student of guerrilla warfare would do well to study the operations of the Fighter Mafia. (Re. bureaucratic warfare)
• The practice of purging the ranks of ‘difficult’ subordinates .. over the years has produced a crop of senior officials long on form and short on substance. The long term result … is an officer corps that is sterile, stagnant, and predictable.
• Story about Boyd’s “Information purposes only” brief.
  • Boyd had mole
  • They planned on letting him get to 3 star level before killing lightweight fighter
  • Before Boyd got to 3 stars he used a backchannel to get dep sec def approval
  • Boyd began 3 star brief with this is not a decision briefing, since sec def approved, todays briefing will be for information only
  • Generals have a heart attack
• Type, nature, and timing of CAS are usually dictated by the Army ground commander. Air support must meet the Army’s needs. The ground CC is the only one who can determine how and when CAS fits in. This doesn’t sit well with the Air Force generals.
  • Note: How does this relate to modern day cyber? Do we need to stop thinking like AF generals and start supporting the warfighters?
• AF prefers interdiction. Interdiction helps to preserve the AF independence from the Army which is more important to the AF then the mission. 
• Interdiction usually does not work. [See page 23] Extremely expensive to buy and maintain. All this for a mission that has historically had little or no influence on the outcome of campaigns or wars.
  • Note: What is our cyber version of interdiction that is over priced and has little impact?

To Be or To Do

• Burton met Boyd in June 1974 when he reported to him at the Pentagon as his deputy. Burton worked in long range planning
• “I believed that the people at the top were equally honest and the system had rewarded them for believing the same as I did. Then I met Boyd.”
• The planning world and the budget decision world were separate. … Political wheeling and dealing, hidden agendas, and turf battles determined the future Air Force, rather than carefully weighted visions
• Chuck Spinney – “Defense Facts of Life” and “Plans/Reality Mismatch and Why We Need Realistic Budgeting”
• B-1 program costs out of control.
  • Official cost: $25 million per plane
  • Deputy program manager revealed it was $100 million per plane and they had not yet built the first one
  • Needed 2 star approval before bringing brief to 3 star.
  • 2 star ordered them to change estimate of future congressional funding to make it higher by billions of dollars
  • This would give impression Air Force had a better chance of being able to buy everything
  • “We were told to fudge the numbers to save a program on a direct order from a two-star general.”
  • B-1 program manager called while they were presenting to the 3 star. When he had discovered his staff had revealed the $100 million figure … he could see his reputation, career, and whole world coming apart before his eyes. He tried to convince the general the figure was wrong.
  • The 3 star told them to keep the $100 million figure
  • When presented with both figures for future funding the 2 star made a case for the higher number but the 3 star asked them which number they liked and they told him the more accurate (lower) number. The 3 star seemed to understand the 2 star was pressuring them
  • Interesting to note the 2 star never became a 3 star whereas the 3 star (Gen Evans) made 4 star
  • 3 star briefed at Corona – Burton thinks they decided to dump the B-1 by finding someone else to do their dirty work i.e. Jimmy Carter
  • 4 years later, Reagan resurrected the B-1 for $280 million per plane, accepted it without testing, then found out the electronics didn’t work
  • This was only one of 3 or 4 incidents within a year’s time that shook his faith in the system
• Boyd pointed out the operations side of the AF did not want change. If changes were made the ops officers might lose their power and influence. They talked freely about needing changes but sabotaged every effort in that direction.
• Burton’s lesson about dealing with people in the Pentagon – trust no one and judge each person solely on actions, not words.
• Burtons story about General Infamous (2 star)
  • Obsessed with looking good in front of the big boss. Caused staff to spend 95% of its time reacting to events rather than controlling them. Gen regularly berated, yelled and screamed at them
  • He controlled their future. He decided which ones would be promoted and which would not. Seeking his favor, they routinely falsified data and information to support answers and statements he had previously given to the chief of staff or secretary before the real info was available
  • He progressed to 4 star
  • They always had the same excuse: When I get to the top, I’ll be in a position to do things right.
  • “They never realized that, in the process of compromising their principles so often in order to get there, they would become programmed to continue operating in that same fashion once they arrived at the top.”
• This is when Boyd gave Burton his To Be or To Do speech.
  • “Jim, you are at a point in your life where you have to make a choice about what kind of a person you are going to be. There are two career paths in front of you, and you have to choose which path you will follow. One path leads to promotions, titles, and positions of distinction. To achieve success down that path, you have to conduct yourself a certain way. You must go along with the system and show that you’re a better team player than your competitors. The other path leads to doing things that are truly significant for the Air Force, but the rewards will quite often be a kick in the stomach because you may have to cross swords with the party line on occasion. You can’t go down both paths, you have to choose. Do you want to be a man of distinction or do you want to do things that really influence the shape of the Air Force? To be or to do, that is the question.”
• The general (Infamous) sought recognition and rewards, while making no contributions. Boyd made contributions that changed things and received few rewards. That’s the way life is in the Pentagon, and it took me a long time to accept it.
• Time and time again Burton prepared speeches or briefs that contained factual info and he was directed to change the data to conform. He refused and then had to watch one of his lackeys make the change.
• He circulated copies of the original versions all around Air Staff exposing the lackeys for what they were.
• He prepared a brief for Sec Def Rumsfeld with a chart showing the turn performance of fighters. F-16 could turn slightly better than the F-15. He was directed to change the chart to show the two as the same.
  • “Although not a big deal in itself, this kind of thing happened daily over a wide range of subjects. Truth and fiction became intertwined. Sound decisions cannot be made in an environment where truth is hard to find.”
• Burton was passed over for promotion to full colonel and then fired
  • “As my boss put it, I was becoming too much of a problem and was no longer a ‘team player’”
• 6 one and two star generals working for general infamous decided to confront him. Only one showed up to do so (Gen John Toomay) and was immediately fired and thrown out of the building.

Storm Clouds of Reform

• Weapons developers always go for the complex. Complexity leads to higher costs
• The fewer the weapons, the tighter is the control of these precious assets by a centralized command structure
  • (See organic design for command and control)
• The more complex, the more difficult it is to test, we are asked to trust and accept claims of future performance. No desire by senior leaders to find out whether or not such claims were true.
• Performance claims were exaggerated, testing involved demos designed and staged solely to support claims
• Complexity, technology, and fewer weapons caused control to tighten. …”the central controller would then dictate what targets to attack and how.” … “The pilots or the infantryman at the end of these electronic tentacles could not be trusted to do what was right. They had to be closely controlled in the name of efficiency.”
• Scheme based on mistrust or presumed incompetence of the people is doomed to failure
• High-tech proponents claimed tech could solve all problems
• High-tech mechanistic warfare – firepower was king and attrition was the objective
• Boyd – “Machines dont fight wars. Terrain doesn’t fight wars. Humans fight wars. You must get into the minds of humans. That’s where the battles are won.”
• Conflict is fundamentally a human endeavor
• At this time there were no real military theorists, they had been replaced by scientists and technologists
• Boyd’s Destruction and Creation paper
  • Mind goes through process of analysis and synthesis to form mental concepts used to govern actions as we deal with ever-changing environment 
  • Sooner or later, these mental concepts no longer match observed reality
  • Unless we change concepts as reality changes we will make decisions and actions that are out of step with reality
  • This causes confusion and if we hold on to our old views become totally out of tune with the real world (isolated system)
  • Confusion and disorder result leading to panic and paralysis
  • Paper links Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle, Godel’s incompleteness theorem, and the second law of thermodynamics
• “Patterns of Conflict” shows how to penetrate an “adversary’s moral-mental-physical being, and sever those interacting bonds that permit them to exist as an organic whole …”
  • Aim is to “render adversary powerless by denying him the opportunity to cope with unfolding circumstances”
  • Ensure that the environment undergoes rapid changes so they are unable to cope
  • Boyd’s theories deal with all types of conflict, not just war. Arguments, bureaucratic battles, political campaigns, guerrilla warfare, corporate competition
  • Dick Cheney listened to it multiple times and discussed it with Boyd. Played a role in Gulf War battle plans.
  • Cheney also canceled the Navy’s $57 billion stealth fighter-bomber program in 1991 because he was misled about cost overruns, schedule slippage, and performance
• Boyd does not give formulas and recipes for one to follow but teaches people how to think.
• When Boyd started briefing, it was more important for an officer to study management principles than guerrilla warfare
• Conventional military thinkers had become locked into the physical aspects of conflict. Ignoring the moral and mental.
• “25 Year War” by Bruce Palmer
  • “One of our handicaps was that few Americans understood the true nature of the war – the devilishly clever mixture of conventional warfare fought somewhat unconventionally and guerrilla warfare fought in the classical manner. (p. 176)
• (Vietnam) Military had a blank check until public learned that we were losing when it had been led to believe we were winning.
  • The mismatch between what was actually occurring and what was being claimed shattered the moral bonds between the military and the public
• Services tried to match Boyd but they lacked agility because doctrine had become dogma and managers had replaced warriors
  • Air Force did the least to change its thinking
  • Army tried to copy Boyds work with new doctrine called “Air Land Battle” doctrine
  • Marines published FMFM-1 based largely on Boyds theories
• Army’s 1976 Field Manual contained an entire chapter on weapons systems and less than one page on leadership
  • It declared that an attacking force could not be successful unless it outnumbered the defender by a ratio of at least 6 to 1
  • Advocated maneuver in order to shoot at enemy. Boyd preached the opposite, shoot in order to create opportunities to maneuver and maneuver in order to create chaos, panic and collapse. “Fighter pilots always come in the back door, not the front”
• Army Lt Col Huba Wass de Czege worked closely with Boyd and was chosen to lead effort to create a new field manual – Field Manual 100-5 Operations (Sep 1982)
  • Centered around Depth, Initiative, Agility, and Synchronization
  • Boyd hated the use of synchronization
  • “How can the Army advocate initiative at the lower levels, agility of fast moving armored forces, and then insist upon everyone remaining synchronized? Synchronized forces can only advance at the pace of the slowest unit. Everyone has to stay in formation and advance together.This is wrong and flies in the face of the other three notions”
  • Synchronization permitted the Iraqi Republican Guard to escape entrapment in the Gulf War
• Wass de Czege established the School of Advanced Studies (SAS). Students dubbed “jedi knights”
• Marine Lt Col Mike Wyly and Gen Alfred Gray worked with Boyd
• By 1978 Burton was convinced the Air Force was headed for disaster. “Not only was I disillusioned by the conduct of many people in positions of power, but I was now openly questioning their competence.”
  • 1. The process of deciding which weapons to develop and buy was undisciplined. It contained few real checks and balances because no one at the top wanted any.
  • 2. The investment philosophy of the Air Force would lead to a hollow force, one that would become smaller, more expensive, and less capable.
  • 3. A deep-seated military mind-set existed that considered warfare in terms of bombing an opponent back to the Stone Age. This Neanderthal approach was totally devoid of any understanding or appreciation of the art of war.
• Gen Toomay became concerned about his attitude
  • He warned if he offered only criticism, he would become a nihilist
  • “Critics are obliged to assume the role of author on occasion”
• Exaggerating a threat to justify new wonder weapons was, and still is, a common practice.
• Burton started working on the “Blitzfighter” airplane based on Boyd’s theories.
  • Counter Soviet tank blitz
  • Opposite of the proposed Enhanced Tactical Fighter ($50 million per) that was a night all-weather interdiction aircraft
  • Blitzfighter was small (1/10th the weight) , simple, lethal, and cheap ($2 million per) for close support of ground troops engaged with Soviet tanks and ability to operate from grass fields instead of runways
• Gen Toomay disagreed about it not having radar but still permitted Burton to proceed without making changes or adding radar. “That’s the kind of man he was.”
• Col Bob Dilger was in charge of producing the ammo used on the A-10
  • He put realism into testing of the ammo
  • Took Soviet tanks, filled them with fuel and ammo, deployed them in desert and had fighter units attack them with test ammo.
  • Revealed for the first time, major inconsistencies in the computer models that were used to predict the lethality of US weapons. Results differed by a factor of two from the model predictions
• Russell Murray on Blitzfighter – Air Force senior leaders would kill the idea as soon as they heard about it. “The airplane doesn’t cost enough. They might buy it if you jack up the price two or three times.”
• Burton eventually promoted to full  colonel on the third try (<3% chance) which allowed him to stay in rather than being forced out under the “up or out” policy
• Gen Infamous was promoted to 4 stars and became Burton and Gen Toomay’s boss
  • “He actually wrapped his arms around me and greeted me like a long-lost brother”
  • Within weeks Burton was shipped out again
  • Aviation Week ran a 2 page story on the Blitzfighter and Gen Infamous went ballistic
  • He was an Enhanced Tactical Fighter advocate and directed Burton to stop briefing.
  • Burton was not even allowed to show him the brief or explain the concept to him in any fashion

Meet Me at the Flags

• In the Pentagon, information is power. The people who know things are the ones who really influence events and decisions.
• The real job of military assistants is to “capture” the civilian officials so that their views, actions, and decisions are consistent with and agreeable to the wishes of the generals. If not they must neutralize the civilians so they cannot interfere too much
• One way is to exclude civilians from certain key strategy sessions.
• Other methods include withholding key critical information, creating special classified categories, ask them to represent the AF in far-off lands just at the time they might be persuasive in internal debates at home, or simply ignore them
• Some civilians are content to be captured
• Few civilian appointees are able to maintain their independence for long
• Some military assistants choose the generals and act as blatant spies in the civilian camp. Others develop close relationships with their civilian bosses and are loyal to them. This makes them career enemies in the general officer corps.
• At times, bureaucratic battles become almost bloody.
• From June 1978 to June 1982, Burton served as military assistant to 3 consecutive AF assistant secretaries (1 dem, 1 rep)
• “Loyalty guided my actions. Loyalty must be earned, not commanded.”
  • 1) If my boss demanded that I be loyal, I responded with integrity
  • 2) If my boss acted with integrity and insisted that I act the same, he earned my loyalty
  • 3) If my boss acted like a scoundrel, he was fair game – boss or not
• Countless civilian Pentagon officials appointed from the ranks of defense contractors conduct themselves as if they were still working for the defense industry instead of the troops
• Mil and civ officials leave gov service and go work for defense contractors who benefited from actions they took before leaving
• Legally permissible, but morally wrong
• Seen program managers lie to high level review boards, generals lie to civilians, civilians lie to generals, and both lie to Congress and the American public. Seldom is anyone held accountable. Many are rewarded
• Neither changes in procurement rules/procedures nor organizational realignments will eliminate the corruption. As long as people in authority behave like scoundrels and are not held accountable for their actions, we will continue to have scandals
• Boyds words about “to be or to do” kept ringing in my ears every time one fo these situations arose
• “Jim, you may not win, but you can’t give the bastards a free ride. Make them work for it.” – Boyd
• BGen Phillips needed Dr Martins (Burtons civ boss) signature for the Enhanced Tactical Fighter
  • Rationale for dev so full of holes and arguments so misleading I could not remain silent
  • Asked 3 questions:
    • What is the mission of this airplane?
      • Night all weather interdiction
    • Can you give an example from history where deep interdiction has actually influenced the outcome of a battle or campaign?
      • Silence
    • Is this airplane going to cost $2 million apiece or $50 million?
      • We dont know yet. (Burton knew cost analysis had said $50 mil)
  • Dr Martin did not sign off on the program
  • Gen Phillips was not happy. Chewed him out later letting him know that he and several other generals would have a feast when he came back into the “blue suit” Air Force
• Word got out Burton was not seen as a team player. Anyone seen talking to him was duly reported to one general or another.
  • This actually encouraged some to talk to him more and his information network began to expand
• There was a growing body of people at the grass-roots level who were sick of the corruption
• Earnest “Earnie” Fitzgerald called them “closet patriots”, people who wanted to expose wrongdoing but were afraid of losing their jobs if they raised an issue
  • In 1969 Ernie told Congress the truth about the costs of the C-5 cargo plane. Costs were $2 billion more than Congress were led to believe
  • He was fired for this but fought through 12 years of legal battles before the courts finally ruled in his favor and ordered the AF to give him his old job back
  • Eventually SECAF ordered to give old job back and even pay his legal fees
  • That SECAF (Orr) came with an open mind and a commitment to do what was right but was eventually “captured” by the generals
• Project on Military Procurement – became a clearinghouse for unclassified information from closet-patriots concerned about fraud waste and abuse
• It was common bureaucratic intel practice to take notes of telephone messages on people’s desks when you visit their offices. (It was also common practice to leave fake messages lying around so they will be noticed)
• Reader may conclude that Burton believed almost everyone near the top to be despicable. This is not the case. He has encountered many good and honest people along the way … but they are in the minority. Most were insecure. They were not willing to take the grief dished out by the system to anyone who gets out of step.
• Defense Facts of Life – exhaustive analysis of the various factors required for an overall judgement of the state of affairs in the tactical forces
  • Using the AF’s own data, Chuck Spinny presented:
    • The AF was decreasing in size
    • Pilots were leaving in droves (not for pay reasons)
    • Flying hours were decreasing
    • Actual training being replaced by simulation
    • Spare parts were not available
    • Skill levels required by mechanics were too high
    • Readiness at an all-time low
    • Cost of readiness was increasing
    • Supplies of ammo would last only a couple of days in all out war
    • Actual performance of frontline systems was seriously questioned
  • “Budget constraints are not the source of the problem”
  • Too much of the money had been spent on overly complex weapons that were extremely costly to operate and maintain. Not enough money was left over to pay support costs.
    • Note: At the time of reading this (3/23/21) the HASC chairman is criticising the F-35 for very similar things. ‘’’The House Armed Services Committee chairman railed at the expensive F-35 Joint Strike Fighter on Friday, saying he wants to “stop throwing money down that particular rathole,” ― just days after the Air Force said it too is looking at other options. “What does the F-35 give us? And is there a way to cut our losses? Is there a way to not keep spending that much money for such a low capability because, as you know, the sustainment costs are brutal,” Rep. Adam Smith, D-Wash., said a Brookings event. … Though the Joint Strike Fighter was conceived as a relatively affordable fifth-generation aircraft, it’s generally acknowledged as the world’s most expensive weapons platform.’’’
  • High tech systems designed to make these airplanes more reliable and cheaper to maintain had an exactly opposite effect
  • F-111D
    • Average time spent fixing things was 23 times greater than predicted. 
    • SE Asia showed radar bombing accuracy was so poor bombs could not hit targets even when equipment worked
    • AF data showed bombs missed target 4 times more in combat than in peacetime
    • AF Vice Chief of Staff, Gen Mathis, had been the program manager for both the F-15 and F-111
    • AF declared war on Chuck Spinney
    • Mathis ordered radar bombing missions against old aircraft hulk on a desert runway in Nevada
    • Burton pointed out this would be different than combat conditions and was no longer invited the Gen Mathis’ strategy meetings
  • Sen Sam Nunn asked Pentagon to send Chuck to brief. Pentagon said no.
    • New transition team got confused and approved it. They were replaced but Nunn got briefed by Spinney.
  • Spinny pointed out money would make things worse, not better
  • Nunn wanted an unclass report from Spinney that he could use
  • Nunn questioned new SECDEF Weinberger about the report, he knew nothing about it
    • Instead of looking into it, the muzzle around Spinney tightened
  • David Chu was selected to head Program Analysis and Evaluation (Spinneys boss) and Chu’s first order was to direct Spinney to stop briefing Defense Facts of Life
  • He was told to go find something else to do, it turned out to be even more controversial
• Spinney next examined the accuracy of the projected production costs of all weapons systems to the actual costs
• Pentagon systematically underrepresented the cost of weapons entering production
  • This meant the proposed Reagan defense buildup was going to cost $500 billion more than Congress and the public had been told
• Brief was called Plans/Reality Mismatch
  • Chu directed him to stop briefing it (via memorandum)
  • Chu raised the issue of whether or not the work was technically correct, wanted an independent study
  • This turned out to be a stall tactic. Took months and eventually confirmed that the work was correct
  • The independent review was unclassified so he sent it to everyone who had heard his brief and everyone who wanted to. A copy leaked to the press and it mentioned his report by name
  • When asked by the press about the report Chu denied that a Spinney report existed
  • Spinney sent a copy of everything to Burton for safe keeping
  • A second study leaked to the press, conducted by the Air Force, coming to the same conclusion
  • Sen Charles Grassley called SECDEF Weinberger and asked to meet Spinney, Weinberger refused. He drove to the pentagon and was again refused. 
  • Grassley called for Senate hearings
  • Sen Tower ( a pentagon supporter) tried to prevent the hearings but Grassley mustered enough support to force a joint hearing
    • Tower scheduled it for a Friday afternoon to get light press coverage, in a small room and tried to ban TV cameras
  • 4 Mar 1983 Spinney presented his brief – The presidents defense plan was going to cost $500 billion more
  • Chu argued the analysis was historical in nature and did not apply to the Regan admin. Somehow this time it would be different
  • Generals thought they won by Monday until Spinney appeared on the cover of Time Magazine along with an 18 page article
  • More hearings resulted and every time Spinney gave his devastating brief and Chu said it was historical and didnt apply
  • Congress requested Spinney update his analysis to include data from the Regan admin
    • When the hearings commenced, Spinney announced his analysis contained no new data. Chu admitted that he had forbidden Spinney to update his analysis
  • 4 months later, Spinney reappeared before Congress with his updated analysis that included 3 years of data under the Reagan admin titled “Is History Repeating Itself?”
    • The answer was a resounding Yes.
    • Chu’s only defense was proved false
    • Chu did not accompany Spinney to these last few hearings
• They tried to fire Spinney by pressuring his immediate supervisor, Bob Croteauc to give him a lower performance rating than the previous year
  • This appeared to be retribution and Spinney lawered up
  • The Washington Post broke the story 
  • SECDFE Weinberger’s director of admin did an investigation and Croteau revealed he had been pressured to lower Spinneys rating
  • Spinney was given a new positive rating
• For Chu’s loyalty he remained the presidents choice to head up PA&E through both Reagans terms, Bush reappointed him.
  • Note: After this book was published, George W. Bush appointed him to Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness “senior policy advisor on recruitment, career development, pay and benefits, and overseeing the state of military readiness”. He is now President and CEO of the Institute for Defense Analyses

The Wheel of Conspiracy

• CC of TAC Air, Gen William Creech, privately pleaded with Murray and Christie of PA&E to do what they could to keep the F-111D out of their inventory.
  • Creech’s staff became a prime source of inside information
  • They always slipped Spinney a bootleg copy of their rebuttal to his work
  • Creech was vocal in opposition yet aided and abetted Spinney
• AF sent 6 F-111Ds to Australia to prove combat effectiveness and touted results
• TAC Air civilian analyst published report of the trip
  • 1. The rest of the F-111D fleet had to be grounded for a month to srip enough parts to supply the 6 planes that made it to Australia
  • 2. 12 Australia bound planes actually departed, 6 broke down on the way, 2 didnt even make it to Hawaii
  • 3. The 6 that did make it to Australia were maintained by civilian contractor mechanics, rather than enlisted AF personnel
  • Air Force Undersecretary Antonia Cheyes admitted these facts in a letter to Murray
• 30 Oct 1979 – CSAF Gen Allen briefed SECDEF Brown on F-111D and how great it was
  • Brief included chart of reliability
  • Murray produced earlier copies of the brief chart showing the numbers had been altered two different times and intended to make things look better than they were
  • Numbers showed reliability was getting worse, not better
  • Gen Allen’s own briefing chart revealed clear signs of the altercations
  • The AF had been exposed as trying to mislead Secretary Brown
• The info that Spinney and the reformers used to outmaneuver the generals always came from deep within the ranks of the Air Force itself
• No. 2 at OSD, Dr Walter LeBerge, sent a letter trying to refute Spinneys radar bombing study using AF analysis of bombing results in Vietnam
  • Films showed radar scopes. AF claimed small distance between the crosshairs and a blob was the combat accuracy of radar bombing
  • Spinney was aware, people who did the study already fed him a copy including recon photos showing where bombs actually hit
  • Measuring distance between the holes in the ground and the target gave the true accuracy – 4 times worse than what the AF claimed
  • Spinney’s rebuttal found its way far and wide throughout the Pentagon
• Gen Mathis became VCSAF (he used to be program manager for F-15 and F-111D)
  • He viewed reformers as a serious threat to the national security, antidefense, and wanted to destroy the military establishment
  • The F-111D was the only thing that could save us from the Soviet hordes
  • He publicly referred to the reformers as “dark and satanic forces”
• A criticism of the F-111D was viewed as a criticism of General Mathis
• Air Force officer assigned to TAC Air – Lt Col “Sleez” – desperately wanted to be promoted
  • His annual effectiveness report was endorsed by the VCSAF
  • Good report guaranteed promotion, poor report meant early retirement
  • Sleez reported back to the VCSAF on the daily activities of everyone in the shop. Pressuring secretaries to inform him of the names of people calling, keeping track of all visitors and even rifling through peoples safes and desks
  • He was caught red-handed rifling desks and safes and when confronted about spying he confessed. Admitting he was pressured by the senior leaders to report the daily activities of the reformers.
  • They demanded Sleez be fired
  • Sleez prepared an affidavit charging the reformers with conspiracy to embarrass the AF
    • He gave it to a secretary to slip to the SECDEF but the reformers ensured he never saw it
  • Reformers picked Maj Ray Leopold as his replacement but CSAF and VCSAF learned of Rays relationship with Boyd and canceled the assignment
  • This led to a confrontation between dep. SECDEF Claytor and CSAF
    • “… according to the Constitution, the civilians ruled the military. … if he wished to remain chief of staff, he would reverse his decision”
  • Ray Leopold was sent to TAC Air
  • Sleez was promoted to full colonel
• As Reagan defense team came on board, the AF prepared an anti reformer briefing and quietly presented it to the new civilian leaders
  • Chu replaced Murray to head PA&E and the AF tried to convince him that dark and satanic forces were hanging out in TAC Air
• AF senior leaders believed reformers were so anti-defense that they would go to any lengths to prevent the Reagan Defense buildup.
  • This was their true concern – the prospect of not getting all that money promised during the election campaign
• The centerpiece of the anti-reformer brief was a chart titled “Wheel of Conspiracy”
  • Resembled a wagon wheel
  • Christie was on the hub as the leader
  • One spoke was conspirators inside the Pentagon such as Spinney and Boyd
  • Another was members of Congress such as Nunn
  • A third listed congressional staffers
  • One identified consultants like Sprey
  • One was for press like James Fallows
  • Burton did not appear on the wheel – The code names appeared to work

Pictures

Need to upload pictures from book.

The Dickey Bird Shuffle

• If senior leaders really want to know what is happening in their domain, they must develop outside sources of information. (outside chain of command)
• Weinberger was always asking “Why didn’t I know about this before?”
  • He probably didn’t want to know beforehand, otherwise he would have been obligated to do something about the situation
• Dickey Bird – Constantly bobbing its head up and down
• A Pentagon dickey bird is simply someone who always agrees with the boss or party line
• Yellow bird – pentagon newspaper showing all defense related news stories of the day
• Reformers used the media, made available evidence of lies from the Pentagon. As time passed, the reformers’ credibility grew and the establishment’s credibility disappeared
  • Reformers leveraged the power of the yellow bird
  • Consequently, Pentagon was always in a state of reaction
• Military Reform Caucus – Bi-partician group of congressmen. By 1985 membership was over 100
• Boyd and Sprey did not use their influence for personal gain.
• Even though they had old, hand-down equipment, Air National Guard units almost always performed better than regular AF units.
  • Reformers used this in their arguments that pilots’ and mechanics’ skills were more important than the technological sophistication of a weapons system
• Burton recalls one officer who presented a cost-effectiveness study showing that it was better to have a few F-15s over a lot of F-16s.
  • Burton saw he had left out some of the F-15s costs
  • When asked why, the officer responded with “I had to, If I included those costs, it might have changed the answer. And I was given the answer to begin with.”
• AF ruined the F-16 design by adding “enhancements” to convert the airplane into a night, all-weather fighter-bomber and an all-weather interceptor
  • The AF deliberately made the plane worse so it would not be much cheaper or hotter than the F-15
  • It wrecked the transient maneuverability (switch from one maneuver to another) which was the feature that won it the fly-off against the YF-17
  • The AF own reporting admitted that the new model was not as good as the old model in dogfighting
• Dr Hermann looked to Burton for solutions
  • Burton suggested a real checks and balances process by establishing a “devil’s advocacy group”  to make an independent examination and recommendation on every program presented
  • He suggested an opposing point of view be presented formally at each program decision meeting
  • 4 generals picked to serve on board with Burton and Hermanns principal deputy, they were not happy as they were asked to take a stand against decisions made by their bosses (something totally new to them)
  • With all the new (true) info now available to them, the 4 generals began to open their eyes and appreciate this “independent look at things”
  • An honest-to-goodness debate at the top with opposing points of view put on the table with equal vigor
  • After Dr Hermann and Burton left, the group was disbanded and they went back to the old way
• Dr Hermann wanted to see a program that hadn’t gone over budget, Burton knew of one
  • Col Bob Dilger agreed to meet and brief his 30-mm ammo program that returned $144 million saved (A-10 ammo)
  • He had introduced competition at the production level
  • When he came to brief Dr Hermann they were told he couldn’t start because “all the generals” were not there. (What generals?)
  • Dilger had to brief all the way up air staff because the generals thought this was going to be a Blitzfighter meeting. The generals were there to make sure they didn’t talk about the Blitzfighter
  • Dilger briefed the program, instead of the AF estimated $83 per cannon shell, Dilger got the cost to $13 per shell
  • When Dilger returned to his base he was rewarded by the AF – He was given 7 days to accept a transfer to an out-of-the-way desk job or retire, he chose to retire
  • When you do good work, the system often rewards you with a kick in the stomach (No good deed goes unpunished)
• One of VCSAF Mathis’ last acts in the Air Force was to cancel Burtons upcoming assignment to a joint testing office as part of the SECAF’s staff and instead go to Wright-Patt in charge of parachutes
  • Burton didn’t ask Dr Keel (his boss, Dr Hermann’s replacement in the Reagan Admin) to intervene but he went to bat for Burton
  • Keel called in Gen Iosue (dep. Chief for personnel) and told him to reinstate the assignment – Iosue refused
  • AF produced a list of generals (totalling 18 stars) who formally opposed Burtons assignment to OSD
  • Keel informed Iosue that if the AF didn’t reverse its decision and reinstate the assignment, he would resign in public (at a press conference) and would raise the issue of civilian rule over the military
  • AF backed down 
  • Burton was very grateful to Dr Keel and felt that he valued the service I had given him.

Hollow Victory

• Although the public believes the business of the Pentagon is defending the nation, its real business is buying weapons
• Many incentives exist for people to usher new weapons successfully into the system including promotions, career advancements, and high salaried jobs with the defense industry after retirement
  • Tests are constructed, analyses are performed, and briefings are shaped to make those weapons systems look good
• If conducted properly, testing provides a natural set of checks and balances to the acquisition process
• Developmental tests – highly controlled, engineering-oriented tests designed to determine if a new weapon meets technical requirements
  • Controlled by the program manager
  • Not really tests but more like staged demonstrations
• Operational tests – designed to stress test the weapon in as realistic an operational environment as possible to determine combat effectiveness
• AF sensor fuzed weapon concept of the early 1980s
  • Program manager presented video of weapons striking and destroying tanks on test range and they were ready for full scale development
  • Mole in org alerted Burton that tests were rigged
  • Weapons were suspended on a tall crane above a circle of tanks, when dropped they could hit a tank without high-tech sensors guiding them
  • Weapons did not home in on the heat from tank engines because tanks did not have their engines running – instead they placed hot plates on the tanks and heated them to a temp 4 times the threshold temp for the infrared sensors, thereby guaranteeing success
  • Reformers constructed a series of questions designed to force program manager to reveal the conditions the test had actually occurred under so they could get the facts without revealing the mole
  • Program manager and AF were embarrassed and program was sent back to square one
• PAVEWAY III
  • Scored 14 direct hits out of 16 launches in developmental tests
  • Operational tests had 39 launches with only 20 hits and 19 failures
  • Testing was suspended 7 times because system did not work well enough to run a test
  • When it didnt work, the average miss distance was 5 miles
  • Approved for production largely on the recommendation of the new commander of Operational Test and Evaluation Command who was Gen Richard Phillips whose formar position was that of advocate for AF weapons systems including the PAVEWAY III
  • Used in Golf War – Reformers point to quote from Gen Schwarzkopf saying allied planes have flown 790 sorties against 33 bridges to suggest videos of direct hits dont tell full story
• Gen Phillips had also been an advocate for the Maverick antitank missile
  • Last 2 operational tests ended in failure so Gen Phillips ordered 2 more to give a good impression
  • These 2 tests had pilots fly a long straight in approach (over 7 miles) while the contractors engineers in the control room gave constant advice on weather the instrument readings were right for a good launch (hardly what would occur in combat)
  • Production approved despite only a 50% success rate in all tests conducted over the years
• Retiring Operational Test and Evaluation Command commander came to Burton privately to express their grave concern about General Phillips
  • Urged Burton to do everything they could to “keep Phillips and his advocates honest.”
  • [My impression] This general knew what was right but didnt have the courage to do it themselves so asked Burton to do it
• Acquisition community senior officials demanded Burton be fired in 3 of these fights – AMRAAM missile, ALQ-131 jamming pod, and alternate fighter engine – for opposing them
• To be fair to Gen Phillips, he was just doing what the leadership wanted him to do
• By 1982 it was clear that the Reagan admin was interested only in throwing money at the Pentagon, not the least bit concerned about how he acquisition community spent the money
  • Realistic testing could very well interrupt the money flow
  • To prevent this ‘team players’ were placed in positions of authority
• “More Bucks, Less Bang: How the Pentagon Buys Ineffective Weapons” by Dina Rasor
• In 1970 Nixon’s Blue Ribbon Panel on Defense had recommended operational testing be separated from the acquisition community
  • Did not happen, chief tester was subordinate to chief developer (Under Secretary for Research and Engineering)
• Dr Richard DeLauer held this position for SecDef Weinberger
  • He had been an executive with TRW Inc (defense industry)
  • DeLauer felt operational testing was a waste of time
  • He believed if a contractor tested the components as they were made, the overall system would work when the components were assembled
  • He approved production of DIVAD air defense gun with NO government involvement – Pentagon would simply give them money and they would deliver a finished product that worked as advertised
  • Army’s Under Secretary was James Ambrose who had previously worked as an executive with Ford Aerospace
  • Ford Aerospace was the company building the DIVAD for the Army
  • Marine LtCol Tom Carter suspected it would not work – he was not supposed to be watching closely but the situation was getting so bad he could not help but notice
  • Carter produced mountains of physical evidence that the program was not going well
  • Over the Army’s strong objections, he convinced DeLauer of this
  • Army leaders directed anger at Carter – he was summoned to Marine Corps HQ and advised that if we wanted to continue in a successful career, he should stop giving the Army a hard time
  • Carter continued fighting until the DIVAD met its demise
  • He then retired as a Lt Col
  • Operational testing occurred in 1985 and DIVAD failed miserably – Weinberger was forced to cancel the program
  • It was the first and last major program Weinberger canceled
  • Story told in Hedrick Smith’s “The Power Game: How Washington Works”
• SINGARS radio – high-tech radio to allow soldiers to communicate in the presence of enemy jammers
  • Enemy didnt have to jam because it jammed itself (whenever one radio net was in the same general area as another)
  • During the Golf War, the SINGARS radio demonstrated all of the previous jamming problems and would not work in the frequency hopping mode that is required to avoid enemy jamming
• Congressional fight with Pentagon on separating chief tester from chief developer
  • Admiral Sam Linder was chief tester – believed they should be separate but was quiet and did not openly fight for it
  • Congressional hearings were held and ADM Linder was called to testify
  • He had orders to disagree with the proposed legislation to separate offices 
  • In prepared statement, he went to great lengths to point out the need to separate the tester from developer (made the point 8 times on the first page alone) yet he concluded with party line that it was not needed.
  • Afterword, Linder walked up to Dina Rasor and told her he supported the reformers and hoped Congress would approve the bill
  • [My thought] another person who knew what was right but ultimately failed the roll call
  • Carter and Burton were DeLauer’s action officers during this fight (inside men) – he instructed them to come up with a list of new initiatives they could conceded to prevent the bill from going through
  • They pulled out a copy of the proposed bill and restated all the provisions as initiatives (bill was drafted by Sprey)
  • DeLauer approved all of them except the one that separated the tester from DeLauer
  • Move didnt work – Bill passed senate by 91-5 and house with unanimous voice vote
  • Chief tester would be independent, guaranteed access to all test data, operating budget determined by congress, would be a voting member of the acquisition review council, and would report test results directly to the secretary of defense and Congress simultaneously, without anyone editing them 
  • Weinberger refused to select a person to fill the position – rather than comply with the new law, they chose to ignore it
  • ADM Linder finally blew up against DeLauer in a meeting with Army Under Sec Ambrose and SecDef Weinberger
  • Ambrose feared Weinberger may be swayed by Linder so he sent a memo to Weinberger in which he objected to Linder’s “silly notion that we should not field equipment until test showed that it really worked.”
  • Admiral Linder resigned shortly after
  • Congress lost patience with Weinberger – He responded by saying “I cant find anyone willing to take the job … why don’t you nominate a candidate?”
  • Burton was asked if he would do it – it would require he retire so he could be a civilian – he agreed under the one condition of Weinberger’s assurance of no retribution against him personally if he chose not to select him.
  • Weinberger chose not to select him and almost another year passed before the first director was appointed (he would come from the defense industry and be just another industry spokesman)

Crossing the Rubicon

• Pierre Sprey began briefing “The Terrible Cost of Not Testing with Real Weapons Shooting at Real Targets”
  • Included excerpt from James Gavin’s “On to Berlin” – Gavin recounted how his troops died needlessly because their new bazookas had failed to stop the German tanks.
  • Too many men had paid the ultimate price for the Army to learn what it should have determined on a test range, not a battlefield
  • Sprey claimed nothing had changed since then – current weapons were not tested for vulnerability to actual Soviet weapons
• Burton decided to check for himself
• Fire and explosion inside a tank are the most deadly
• Israel suffered tremendous burn casualties from this during the 1973 war – mostly in American-made tanks. They decided to build their own tank, the Merkava, designed to eliminate casualties from ammo fires and explosions. In the 1982 Middle East War, casualties due to this were nonexistent
• Technical community had been moving away from realism and closer to simulation and computer modeling
• Vehicles tested empty or with water in the fuel tanks to prevent fires – fuel and live ammo were never present. 
  • Fire made it difficult to collect precise scientific data inside the vehicle and they needed that data to feed their computer models to calculate the vulnerability (of which fire and explosion were the most dominant)
• These computer models had never been verified – every time someone tried they failed miserably
  • Exercise called MEXPO they compared predictive models with actual results
  • Tremendous mismatch between predicted damage and actual damage
  • Models were changed and they tried again – the mismatch got worse
  • Models were tweaked again and retried – mismatch again got worse
  • Vulnerability community then gave up
  • Models continued to be the primary tool for assessing overall vulnerabilities and thus had major influence on decisions about which weapons to buy
• Real weapons not used in tests – lab devices constructed to simulate weapon warheads
  • They only wanted to gather certain kinds of data to feed their computer models
  • Models could then be adjusted to produce an answer that supported a preferred decision – realistic test results could not be controlled
• Viper – new bazooka
  • Proposed at $78 per – entered production at $787 per
  • Concern over size of warhead – Congress forced army to stop production and conduct a shoot-off between Viper and several European bazookas
  • Not a single round was fired at a tank – they placed the warheads on top of a block of steel and detonated them
  • The size of the hole was measured and entered into a computer model and the model determined the winner
  • Army, OSD, and Congress accepted it without question
• Burton created the Joint Live-Fire Test Program
• Revolutions or major changes in the behavior of large organizations usually have a better chance of succeeding if they come from the bottom up, instead of being imposed from the top down.
• Joint Live-Fire Test Program approved and chartered by OSD on 27 Mar 1984
  • Participants from every service except the Navy – unable to attract enough support from them – they couldnt handle the thought of shooting real Soviet weapons at their vessels
  • Chose Bradley Fighting Vehicle to test first because 1) a lot of lives were at stake if we were to go to war and it be used, 2) it was early in the production phase so changes could still be made
• BFV (see Pentagon Wars movie)
  • M-113 replacement (APC) to transport an 11 man infantry squad to the battlefield
  • In dev for 17 years
  • They wanted Bradley to engage other vehicles but didnt beef up the armor accordingly
  • Someone wanted portholes so people could shoot out – feature proved to be useless and the portholes were sealed up
  • By 1980 it had 3 missions
  • It performs a variety of tasks but does no task very well
  • Ended up only being able to carry a squad of 6, not 11
  • Was intended to be a scout vehicle but ended up being the largest vehicle on the battlefield at 10 feet tall
  • Given an antiarmor mission – 2 man turret added with TOW antitank missiles – guaranteed that it would be subject to return fire from antitank weapons yet still no more armor
  • Stuffed with dangerous ammo – carried more ammo than any vehicle on the battlefield
  • Decided to start production with no vulnerability tests of any kind – a few tests of small arms fire against its armor plates, but those plates had failed
  • Letter to OSD from Army Assistant Secretary Percy Pierre (17 Mar 1980) 
    • “The key factor here is the relative importance of various kinds of testing .. We feel it is counterproductive to conduct destructive testing on such a precious asset …”
• Army agreed to conduct some vulnerability tests
  • Since the contract specified the armor was only required to protect against small arms fire, that is all that was tested. They were fired at an empty Bradley with no ammo inside and fuel tanks full of water
• “The $13 Billion Dud” by William Boly
  • Claimed Bradley aluminum armor was more dangers than steel armor
  • Aluminum’s chemical energy when oxidized is ten time greater than TNT
  • Cited British experiments in 1980 that compared aluminum armor to steel – they showed aluminum caused more casualties
• Army’s Ballistics Research Laboratory – Richard Vitali was chief of the Vulnerability/Survivability division
  • Vitali had agreed in writing to test for fuel fires but he refused when it was time for the tests
  • Romainian weapons (with smaller warheads) were substituted for Soviet weapons
  • Uniforms on dummies caught fire so they were stripped naked, they still caught fire so they hosed down everything inside the vehicle just before the test
  • Burton used Bob Dilger as his independent observer when he could not be there
  • Large doses of toxic gasses were detected so they stopped taking measurements
  • Army Surgeon General put pigs and sheep inside to test effects of the choking fumes following a hit – animals were sacrificed within minutes after each test – not long enough to determine if complications developed from breathing the fumes, no tests for flash blindness, no one was permitted to observe the autopsies
  • Surgeon General reported no serious aftereffects 
  • Burton did watch one veterinarian go into the Bradley 5 min after a test to retrieve the animals only to stagger out choking and collapse unable to breathe. They were able to revive him but from then on all vets wore self contained oxygen masks
  • Vitali would first agree to a test then refuse. Talked about delaying the start of live fire tests for 2 years by which time the production contract would be near completion
• ADM Linder resigned and Charles Watt took his place in an acting capacity
  • Watt would not raise the testing issue with the Army because it might jeopardize his chances of getting Linder’s job permanently
  • BGen Mike Hall was Burtons new supervisor. Both hall and Watt agreed with Burton but neither would get involved as it could be detrimental to their careers
• Some OSD officials made calls in support but stopped at that, content with only making a token effort
• Burton had a decision to make – weather to cross the Rubicon
  • He sat down with his wife and two children
  • He wanted to raise the issue to the highest levels but doing so could lead to personal and professional retribution – he may be out of a job and blacklisted
  • Both children were in college with out of state tuition costs
  • In the end his wife made the decision, she knew he couldn’t live with himself if he didnt, “We can always get along somehow”
• 14 Jun 1984 Burton wrote his “Rubicon Memo”
  • Charged Army and BRL of purposely conducting unrealistic tests and their tests were not useful and could put 50000-70000 lives at stake
  • Burton asked Dr Wade to direct Army to install a new management team and conduct realistic tests
  • Dr Wade, Burton and Army leadership met – Army was furious with him
    • Lt Gen Robert Moore: “We don’t want to test it because we know what will happen. It will just blow up and people will get all excited over that and want to cancel the Bradley.”
    • Burton: “If you know that it is unsafe, then why don’t you do something about it?”
    • Lt Gen Moore: “We plan to make a few design changes at the next block change two years from now.”
    • Bruton: “No! I don’t believe you. I think you will forget all about it once the spotlight is off the subject. This time, we are going to run some real test and if a few Bradley blow up in the process, then you will have to do something about changing the design.”
  • Dr Wade supported Burton
  • Army directed Vitali to prepare a plan to complete full-up testing, performed as Burton wanted it, by October 1985. This was documented in 2 separate memoranda for record (one written by Vitali himself)
  • A month later BRL submitted the plan calling for testing in late 1986 and no commitment for live ammo or fuel but that the Bradley would be configured in inert fashion (ammo filled with sand)
  • Burton prepared a strongly worded memo for Dr Wade to send them. Wade did not want to sign it but instead called and read the memo
• Gen Hall called Burton into his office and informed him that his position had been eliminated 
  • RIF and Hall chose Burton’s position to be eliminated instead of the two empty positions in the office
  • Burton documented action in a memo for record that he distributed throughout the Pentagon
  • He made sure every office in OSD and Army staff related to the Bradley program received copies of all the memos and letters that dealt with the Bradley
  • “Lots of little brothers and sisters” – No intention of leaking but with the Pentagon full of copies he messaged to the Army that he was still in the fight and the possibility of a leak increased
• 21 Sep – Army announced it wanted to withdraw Bradly from Joint Live-Fire Test Program and conduct the full-up tests on its own. They promised to complete the tests by October 1985
  • Invited Burton to participate – help with test plan and observe each test shot
• Word of RIF leaked to Capitol Hill and 4 chairmen of Military Reform Caucus wrote to SecDef Weinberger believing that eliminating the job was an act of retribution
• Burton agreed to Army’s invite – He forced Army to do tests by working inside the system
• Boyd cautioned – If the story broke in the press, Burton should not talk to any reporters under any circumstances. Otherwise he would be accused of being another whistleblower. 
  • He also decided not to talk to members of Congress or staffers
• Story hit the front page of the Washington Times on Monday 1 October – similar stories appeared in every major newspaper

Off to Alaska?

• To get congress of their backs, Dep SecDef announced Burton would stay in job until tests were complete.
• Burton was now living in a fishbowl
• Burton realized Army was spying on him
  • Army Col Dale Brudvig began reporting Burtons activities to the senior Army leadership (meetings, calls, all writings)
  • Burton knew but didnt say anything – he had his own network of informers in the Army
  • Burton began to structure his writings to influence them – the real audience was senior Army leadership – “reverse pump”
• Full up tests began Sept 1985 – SecDef Weinberger asked to keep him personally informed
  • Gen Colin Powell was his military assistant so Army leadership had copy of Weinbergers note as soon as Burton did
• Burton now had access to Armys highest leaders
  • He needed to be absolutely correct in everything he said
  • He would no longer be a threat if he was wrong and discredited
• In Sept, Army agreed to 10 shots with Soviet antitank weapons vs fully loaded Bradley
  • Army would not permit any of the ten shots intentionally to hit the ammunition
  • They would pick the aim points so it would miss the ammo
  • They claimed they knew a direct hit would destroy the vehicle so no need to test as it would cause adverse publicity
  • Burton protested as this was a bias selection but Army didnt budge
  • Reason they withdrew from the joint live fire test program was so they could fund the test and would get to dictate how the tests would be done.
    • First test shot missed the aim point and hit several boxes of cannon ammo – result was a small explosion and a small fire that self-extinguished 
  • Army was going to do everything in its power to protect the Bradley’s reputation
• In Dec, Army Under Secretary Ambrose announced the Army was not going to honor the Sept test agreement or test the current Bradley design at all
  • The army already knew all the answers so why test, make some changes and only test those when they are ready
  • Burton countered with “If you do not test the current Bradley design to establish a baseline of knowledge, then how  do you know that your so-called improvements will actually make things better? They may make things worse, not better. I have seen this happen on several systems before.”
  • He followed up with the credibility argument: The Army had told Congress and the public that it would test the Bradley, now it was going back on its word.
  • Burton was calm and collected, yet firm. He went out of his was to avoid appearing emotional or combative
  • Ambrose reversed his decision and would proceed with the tests
• Phase 1 tests dealt with current bradley designs – Phase 2 tested modifications
  • Would also run the same 10 shots vs old M-113 and Soviet BMP as comparisons
  • Phase 1 began March 1985
• 8 Mar 1985 – AFPC Col’s Group calls and tells Burton he is being transferred to Alaska
  • 7 days to transfer or retire
    • Year later he would learn Alaskan Air Command didnt want Burton and formally objected as Burton didnt have any qualifications
  • Boyd: “This was about as dumb a thing the Air Force could do. Whoever dreamed up this one was truly general officer material”
  • Word of transfer spread through Pentagon like wildfire – would leak in no time
  • Burton made copies of his transfer notification and freely passed them out
  • Word leaked to Capitol Hill and the Military Reform Caucus (over 100 bi-partisan members)
  • Press asked and PA office denied the transfer – press then got hold of official transfer notice and realized they had been lied to and turned the heat way up
  • Burton refused to talk to anyone
  • SECAF concluded he should cancel Burtons assignment
  • Burton became a nationally known figure – this notoriety was his best protection
• Preliminary tests conducted over the summer
  • Models run before and after each shot – what actually happened bore no relation to what was predicted 
  • Burton believed environment inside vehicle after a hit is too complex to be captured completely by a computer model
    • “The Cosmetic Blueprint” by Paul Davies in 1988
      “For a chaotic system, however, simulation is pointless, because we only get the same amount of information out as we put in. More and more computing power is needed to tell us less and less. In other words, we are not predicting anything, merely describing the system to a certain limited level of accuracy as it evolves in real time.”
• House Armed Services Committee coveted burtons description of testing and completion dates into formal legislation which mandated all actions covered by his agreement with the army actually occur
• BGen Donald P Jones arrived to become Burtons immediate supervisor
  • He was a personnelist

More Dirty Games

• Burton established a close relationship with the technicians who did the actual work at Aberdeen
  • He went out to seek their opinions
  • They wanted to help and became his eyes and ears inside the system
  • He got private viewings of the damage from each shot and could compare them with formal documented results
  • They would let him know if they were ordered to do anything out of the ordinary and Burton would arrange to stumble upon the new setup or conditions
• First test shot proved BRL model wrong – shot hit ammo and did not destroy vehicle
• Second shot confirmed armys worst fears
  • Shot again missed aim point and hit ammo (gunner may have helped)
  • Ammo fire did not self-extinguish this time and vehicle was destroyed
• Army said they met the obligation to Burton since a vehicle was destroyed and the rest of the Burton tests were canceled
• BRL’s Vitali tested a future shot and realized it may hit ammo so he cancelled the shot because he was afraid of the outcome and would not allow BRL to count it as if it had occurred
• “I want you to know that there is nothing personal in whatever happens next” – Burton’s words had already gained a reputation at BRL and he wanted to create a few demons in their minds
  • Burton went to the army spy col and told him to tell the army he was going to write another memo and this one would be a real barn burner
  • Army Vice Chief wanted burtons memo before it was even finished – he waived the memo in front of Vitali and his 4 star boss saying “Do you guys enjoy reading these memos in the Washington Post?”
  • The test was reinstated
• Army had ammo compartments that would vent to the outside and prevent a lot of the problems experienced
  • Burton wanted to test these on the Bradley as part of Phase 2
  • Unbelievably the Army and contractor would later fight bitterly to avoid testing the ammo compartments
• BRL began preparing the Phase 1 report to congress
  • They were pumping up the good news while suppressing the bad
  • Burton announced he would write an independent report
  • He brought this up with BGen Jones who agreed and directed him to do so
  • 6 months later Jones would deny this to the Inspector General and do everything in his power to hide the reports existance
  • BRL decided, for example, that it would not report any test results from the off-line ammo tests that measure the violence of the reaction inside the bradley when ammo was intentionally hit 
  • This along with other decisions gave impression when reading that bradley would seldom burn or blow up in combat
  • Army used Cavalry Fighting vehicle in the 10-shot live fire tests saying since it had more ammo it was more dangerous
  • Ammo was actually stored differently so the Infantry Fighting vehicle actually presented a larger ammo profile to enemy gunfire 
  • Burtons report included this along with depictions – Infantry version had largest ammo-presented area of all test vehicles, including the Soviet vehicles
  • Because tests were deliberately aimed to avoid ammo, armys argument for using cavalry version was bogus
  • M-113 and Soviet BMP carried 11 man squad – 2x as many as cavalry version
  • Contained wooden mannequins
  • Naturally, raw data showed twice as many casualties in others as in the Bradley
  • Burton calculated casualties that would have occurred if Army had used infantry version
  • Burton gave copies to every OSD office and army to critique it – probably 100 copies were floating around the pentagon
  • Burtons concern was for the people in the vehicle – people first, vehicle second
  • Army’s main concern clearly was whether the Bradley could still move and shoot after a hit
  • Burton insisted computer models predictions be included so it showed how off the models were
  • Models were wayy off in one direction or another – so the army averaged the errors and claimed they were fairly accurate 
• Charlie Watt – still had acting in his title and above BGen Jones – decided Armys report would get sent up
  • Congressmen Denny Smith had asked for Burtons report – Under Sec Def Dr Hicks accused Burton of going around him
  • Burton had not talked to Smith – Army and OSD had at least 100 copies floating around as they critiqued it
  • General Accounting Office (GAO) also asked for a copy as congress had mandated it
  • Burton followed the rules to the letter
  • Dr Hicks told him that he was not to write any independent reports about anything – all he could do was watch tests
  • Hicks told Burton “If I get any more calls from congress about you, you’re fired”
  • Burton took issue with this and turned around and went head to head with him
  • Word of confrontation with Hicks spread like wildfire – news also spread to Capitol Hill
  • Without notice, Burton was summoned to Capitol Hill to answer questions about the report
  • During the meeting (or really hearing) a staffer stormed in with Burtons report
  • Burton was then asked if Dr Hicks threatened him about talking to congress – Burton answered that he preferred not to answer
  • In a written response to The Post, PA denied Burton had a written report and denied the threat
  • 15 Feb 1987 after Dr Hicks left gov service, he admitted on camera in a 60 Minutes interview that he did issue the threat
• Hicks maintained Burton had not written a report so SecDef Weinberger reported to Congress that there was no report
  • Director of Operational Testing John Krings was now the chief tester, he attended the meetings and knew of the report – he privately gave Weinberger a copy of the report
  • Weinberger made Hicks personally carry a copy of the report to Capitol Hill
  • Before it was given, Burtons supervisors altered the first page without his knowledge or agreement – it eliminated all reference to the fact it had been prepared as a formal report
  • Eventually, due to all the controversy, hearings were scheduled
• Hicks held up a copy of Burtons proposed statement to congress and said “I dont like your statement and I want you to change it”
  • “Ill be happy to correct any mistakes”
  • “Everything you have said is correct, but I dont like the tone. I dont like your adjectives, change them”
  • Burton refused
• The night before the hearing OSD PA informed burton all his comments in his statement was classified
  • He knew this wasnt true as he only used unclass Army documents as the source
    • Example: “Bradley casualties can be significantly reduced”
  • Next day burton called and said: Tell your vice chief of staff if you dont reverse your decision I intend to stand up and say “My testimony today has been censored by the United States Army. I have been forbidden to say what needs to be said in a public hearing. I am prepared to prove that my testimony is unclassified. I am also prepared to prove that certain Army generals who are present in the room have themselves revealed classified information to the press in recent days because it suited their purpose to support the Bradley”
  • An hour before the hearing Burtons original prepared statement was formally cleared for release with no changes or restrictions

Going Public

• As he was preparing to testify he heard of the space shuttle disaster (28 Jan 86)
• Congressman Stratton wanted to cancel the hearing as he said his subcommittee had jurisdiction. Stratton was friendly to the army and had many defense contracts in his district.
• Burtons comments on the bradley
  • Ammo in the troop compartment is the major cause of unnecessary casualties:
    • When hit, casualties increase by factors of 2-3
  • Fuel and fire extinguishers in troop compartment may force troops out of vehicle almost every time it is hit
    • Atmosphere inside after a hit is simply intolerable. Casualties can be significantly reduced by moving ammo, fuel and extinguishers out of troop compartment
  • When ammo was hit, casualties were about the same as BMP: ammo presents about 3 times as much area to a hit as does the BMPs. We can therefore expect greater casualties in combat
• “Independent assessments on results in parallel with Service assessment are crucial”
  • Burnton then had to explain that his superiors had instructed him to explain to the subcommittee that this final point was his own personal opinion and did not reflect their views.
  • The disclaimer forced upon him presented a rather sinister implication of senior pentagon managers opposed to independent views on test results because those views might expose dirty games
• Dr Hicks, in an interview with NY Times openly criticized the fact Burtons report had caused so much attention
  • In an interview with Science Magazine Hicks freely admitted he would award research funds only to scientists who publicly supported the Pentagon’s programs
  • He had made that proclamation during his Senate confirmation hearing – “I have a tough time with disloyalty”
• Army vice chief Gen Thurman knew committee members were on burtons side so he went out of his way to be respectful and courteous – he tried to convince them that the doctrine and tactics the Army had developed for the bradley would prevent it from being ravaged on the battlefield
  • Army’s argument
  • Auto fire suppression system effective in extinguishing fuel fires
    • Didnt mention 2 out of 3 times it discharged there was no fire
  • Little effect on vehicle or crew due to overpressure and temp (vaporifics)
    • Pressure high enough to rupture eardrums – Army didnt consider this a casualty
  • Prevention of penetration and spall will reduce vehicle damage and casualties
    • First sales pitch at new high tech armor, future events would show it could not prevent major penetrations
  • Spall has minimal effect on ammo due to ammo packaging
    • Small low speed fragments didnt set off ammo; large high-speed fragments did
  • Secondary fires unlikely
  • Survivability can be improved
    • Army claimed Burton saying “Bradley casualties could be significantly reduced” was classified
• Army report said ammo pose the most significant hazard to the crew – they failed to bring this up during the hearing
• Army announced new explosive armor system, which was still highly classified, would solve some of the Bradleys issues
  • Another example of how information can be classified or declassified at will to suit political needs, rather than to protect national security
  • Armor only stopped small-caliber rounds, not medium or large
  • Only 6% of engagements involved small-caliber, when troops were typically dismounted
  • New armor was being developed to protect an empty vehicle in only 6 percent of its engagements
  • Medium and high caliber rounds still caused extremely high casualties
• Burton was concerned Army was structuring Phase 2 tests to make its reactive armor look good
  • No tests planned for any modifications that separated fuel and ammo from troops – BRL only wanted to test new reactive armor
  • Burton felt they had an obligation to the troops to examine every reasonable solution 
  • BRL eager to show new tech would solve everything – it would enhance BRL’s image and preserve its share of the Army’s budget
  • Burton felt having BRL in charge of tests to prove the validity of its own technical claims was wrong and a conflict of interest
• Burton worked with Pierre Sprey to design “Minimum Casualty Baseline Vehicle”
  • Ammo compartments that exploded to the outside atmosphere when hit
  • Storing TOW missiles on the outside
  • Move fuel tanks to the outside rear
  • Lining entire troop compartment with a properly spaced Kevlar liner to prevent spall flying around
  • Troops access ammo through sliding panel doors – This was already standard on M-1/M-1A1 tanks
  • Troublesome fire extinguisher removed due to fuel now being stored on outside
• During Strattons hearing Burton was sent alone to testify
  • Gen Thurman appeared with legions of Army experts
  • Burton used hearing to announce Army had agreed to include Minimum Casualty Baseline Vehicle in the Phase 2 tests
  • Army would later try everything in its power to avoid testing it but congress eventually mandated it under threat of closing the production line
  • Congress endorsed Burtons proposal for the minimum casualty baseline and request that no reports be submitted or decisions made until it was tested and compared with Armys preferred vehicle
  • On 24 Feb, Dr Hicks signed a letter to Gen Thurman directing the Army to complete Phase 2 tests on the Minimum Casualty Baseline before any report went to congress. 
  • Under pressure from the Army, Hicks would later back off from this directive

The Great Memo War

• Fred Widicus, FMC’s Washington rep asked burton privately for a copy of the Minimum casualty baseline specifications so FMC could start construction
  • Army was trying to delay preparations
• During Brutons visit to FMC, he noticed 2 different configurations of M-113
  • One had fuel on the outside, the other had them on the inside
  • The external fuel tank ones were for Israel, internal were for the US
  • Israel learned from combat that the M-113 was a “burner” and wanted fuel tanks outside to prevent this
  • US kept fuel tanks inside as a bench for troops to sit on
  • Why? FMC answer: “I only do what the Army tells me”
• If the Army stalled long enough, interest in modifying the bradley to make it safer would fade
• Hicks and burtons 2nd level superior Dr Navarro finally yielded to the Army and agreed to split phase 2 into 2 separate tests and reports 
• 1 Apr 1986 Dr Navarro directed Army to use a random shot selection scheme for phase 2 tests 
  • Army ignored him and proceeded with shots that were handpicked by BRL
• 3 Apr 1986 Burton was informed he had 7 days to accept a new assignment to Wright-Patt or retire
  • Congressmen were outraged and wrote letters
  • Senator Nancy Kassebaum was conspicuously absent
  • Even Congressman Stratton asked Weinberger to keep Burton as he feared that his transfer might rally Bradley critics and may gather enough strength to cancel the program. (FMC also felt this way)
  • Burton learned of this through the newspapers – they claimed Dr Hicks was behind the transfer
  • Burtons superiors did not allow him to see any of these letters or any of their responses to Capitol Hill. 
  • He would learn later the responses were not truthful
  • FMC had terrific spy network and Fred Widicus gave burton a copy of every memo
  • 10 Apr was deadline for Burtons formal decision
  • That day his boss, Army Gen Donald P Jones and Air Force head of personnel Maj Gen Robert Oaks were summoned to Capitol Hill and pressured to cancel the transfer but they stood firm and insisted he go
  • At committees request, Gen Oaks extended the deadline for his transfer another 7 days until 17 April
  • Sec Weinberger, in a letter to Congress, would imply arrangements had been agreed to by the Air Force and explained to Burton on 7 April that he could stay to monitor tests and return from new assignment to monitor tests on Minimum Casualty Baseline. These arrangements did not exist on 10 April and were not explained to Burton.
• Also on 10 Apr a Phase 2 test shot on the new BRL armor went through the armor and into 2 5-gallon water cans that had be intentionally placed directly behind the aim point
  • Vehicle configuration had water mounted in the left rear of troop compartment
  • BRL ordered the technicians to reposition the water cans directly behind the aim point for the 10 April shot.
  • Originally there had been two boxes of cannon ammo in that location
  • Burton realized hitting water cans was not an accident or coincidence
  • Using combat data, burton calculated the probability of water cans being hit in their original location and compared it with probability of them being hit in new location
  • There was no significant difference
  • Changing positions would not change vulnerability but certainly changed the test results as almost 25% of test shots were aimed at the cans
  • This was an attempt to influence the outcome of the test in case the BRL reactive armor did not stop the attacking round – which it did not
  • 15 April 1986 burton sent out “The Water Can Memo” – 21 copies to the Army and countless more to the rest of OSD staff
  • Also mentioned watering the dummy uniforms, using 5 man instead of 9 man configuration, selecting shots instead of random aim points
  • No one involved in these decisions has been held responsible and one had twice been reassigned to positions of higher authority and broader responsibilities 
  • A memo leaked and a congressmen scheduled a press conference 
  • A 2 star wanted burton to call the congressmen with him – burton refused
  • An aide of the congressmen listened as the general argued the army didnt mean to and it isn’t devious, its just dumb. The aide then told the general they didnt get burtons memo from him, they got it from a senior army officer
  • The congressmen had the press conference and released copies of the memo
  • Army tried to claim most shots would hit center of mass – this was false
  • Burtons memo showed – based on history, approximately 1 percent of combat hits could be expected to strike the water cans in either location, yet almost 25 percent of all test shots were aimed at the cans
• On 17 April 1986 the deadline arrived and Burton signed the retirement papers
  • He wrote across the papers in bold “All I wanted to do was see the Bradley tests through to the end. It is clear now that I will not be permitted to do that, so I am retiring. My work is finished.”
  • 20 min after he signed the papers, Gen Jones burst into the office and handed him a copy of a letter that Sec Weinberger sent to Congress.
  • It said that if Burton agreed to transfer the Air Force would let him stay and monitor the phase 2 tests and come back to monitor the minimum casualty baseline tests
  • This was the first time Burton was made aware of this.
  • Gen Jones later admitted to the congressional investigation team and in sworn testimony to DoD IG that he did not inform Burton of these agreements with the Air Force until after Burton signed the retirement papers.
  • This was a deliberate act of withholding information that might have influenced my decision to retire or accept transfer
• Army was aiming at the center due to calculating peace-time accuracy data with a one-sigma bivariate normal distribution ellipse
  • They argued 68 percent of shots would land in this ellipse
  • Pierre Sprey noted it applies to one-dimensional, not bivariate distributions
  • The ellipse actually represented only 39 percent
  • Combat data would show this was actually 29 percent.
• House armed services committee set up an investigation team and burton learned one of the Army’s key defenses was the 68 percent number.
  • Burton let them rely on this defense then afterword wrote a memo pointing out the mistake
  • Burton asked a mathematician from Institute of Defense Analysis to present the memo to the team so they would not have to solely rely on him
  • It destroyed the armys case and its credibility
  • The army had made a mistake and designed an entire test program around it
  • The final report confirmed almost every one of Burtons charges
  • The decision was made after the aim points were selected
  • “An FMC interoffice memo dated March 10, 1986 documents that 25mm ammunition was stowed ‘at the aim point (turret center line)’ and suggested that it would be better to move the ammunition and store inert items, including water in this area”
• In mid-May, Dr Navarro called Burton into his office and gave him a direct order to stop writing memos
• Battle over random shots vs hand picked shots
  • Army asked National Academy of Sciences to study the problem
  • Initial draft accepted BRLs philosophy of hand picked shots
  • Burton wrote a blistering critique of the report 
    • You assume primary purpose is to calibrate computer models, not reduce casualties
    • Fails to devise a procedure to find major sources of casualties
    • Fails to mention there is a need to develop fixes to reduce those casualty sources
    • Fails to identify need to verify that the fixes in fact reduce casualties adequately
    • Doesnt even have the word casualty in the report
  • Burton sent a copy to every member and asked them to withdraw and redo it
  • Dr Navarro advised the chairmen to ignore Burtons letter
  • The Academy decided they couldnt ignore it and rewrote the report recommending a random shot selection
• Memo went out trying to refute Burtons memo but was full of outright falsehoods
  • On the day he retired we went to the pentagon with his wife to have lunch with friends
  • He would later learn she had spent countless hours with professional counselors, friends, and ministers as she tried to find the strength to cope but she always supported him
  • After lunch, he sat down and wrote one last memo
  • The Army’s memo said “The Army did not claim during the briefing to Dr Navarro, nor has it ever claimed that most of the hits would fall inside the ellipses.” 
  • The Congressional report clearly stated on page 8: “The Army witness stated that the majority-68 percent- of the shots in combat would fall in this [ellipse] area”
  • Burton pointed this and other falsehoods out in his last memo
  • When he was done, he walked the halls of the pentagon with his wife delivering the memo to all the relevant offices

Case Study: The Navy Runs Aground

Need to add notes from this section

Epilogue

• Burton assures the reader that all of the events are a matter of record.
• Congress voted to see if Bradley would be cancelled
  • FMC and Army argued about how many jobs would be lost in each congressmans district rather than Bradleys merits
  • Vote failed and bradley didnt get cancelled
• Significant events between June 86 and Dec 87
  • Phase 2 test completed on both configurations – Due to congress forcing it to 
  • Phase 2 aim points selected by National Academy of Sciences was random shot
  • All phase 2 tests were full-up with live ammo and fuel
  • BRL was removed from all responsibility in Phase 2 tests
  • As result of Phase 2, design was significantly changed to make vehicle safer
    • Computer models still do not even address casualties from toxic gases
    • Army moved some of the ammo out of the troop compartment and repositioned the rest
  • The M-1 and M-1A1 went through the same live-fire tests
  • Several Soviet armored vehicles also went through live-fire tests
  • Congress passed legislation to require all new weapons systems to go through live-fire testing
  • Burtons job of the Joint Live-Fire Test Program director was converted to a civilian senior executive service position with a small staff
  • Congressional investigating team reported events surrounding Burtons retirement were highly unusual and disturbing. It recommended IG do a formal investigation. IG concluded all 3 attempts to remove Burton were routine personnel actions
• At end of Phase 2, Army announced it was making major modifications to all Bradleys and retrofitting more than 2000 existing
  • Every speaker emphasized casualties and casualty reduction techniques – data was plentiful and open for all to examine
• Without constant vigilance, the Pentagon quickly slips back to business as usual
  • Pentagons acquisition executive, claiming live fire testing is no longer needed, has launched a campaign to repeal all relevant legislation
  • Congress cannot legislate integrity, character, and honesty
  • The only way to change the system is to find people with these traits and then hold them accountable for their actions
• Gulf War showed yet again that interdiction as a concept failed – failed to prevent the flow of enemy troops and equipment out of the theater of operations
  • Air Force identified 54 rail and highway bridges 
  • At time of cease fire only 40 were damaged enough to be classified as inoperable despite a concentrated effort to destroy them
  • 2 weeks in the allies had already flown 790 sorties against 33 of the bridges
  • Claims of pinpoint accuracy by laser guided munitions may not have been totally correct
• Vast majority of damage to tanks/artillery/vehicles was done by A-10
  • B-1 did not participate in the war
  • Represented only 15% of combat aircraft but flew a third of total sorties and responsible for more than half the confirmed bomb damage
  • Before the war General Horner criticized the A-10; during the war he praised it; and after the war he criticized it again
• Army “Air Land Battle” doctrine
  • Depth, Initiative, Agility, and Synchronization
  • Boyd criticized synchronization as logically inconsistent with the other 3
  • If people must synchronize their actions then their initiative and agility are stifled
  • “Synchronized units can only move at the pace of the slowest unit”
  • Goal of Gulf War was to circle around behind the Iraqi forces northward through the western desert
  • Armor Gen gave 3 reasons for halting his forces and not cutting off the Iraqi’s
    • They had not practiced breaching operations at night
    • He was afraid some of his forces would get too far ahead of the others and he wanted to keep everyone in formation
    • He feared that even small enemy tank units if bypassed would wreak havoc on his long lines of fuel trucks that were carrying thousands of tons of fuel behind his jet-powered tanks
  • Gen Franks failure to cut off the Republican Guards escape can be traced to his strict adherence to synchronization
  • If they operate synchronized and encounter elements unknowingly or intentionally out of formation they will assume they are enemy 
  • The high percentage of casualties from fratricide was a direct result of trying to operate in an ordered, synchronized fashion
  • Gen Franks was promoted to 4 stars and placed in command of Army’s Training and Doctrine Command
  • Gen John Wood – Tiger Jack – didnt worry about syncronization in WW2 – 4th Armored traveled farther and faster in drive from Avranches to the Moselle River against 1st rate Wehrmacht than did any of Franks divisions in Gulf war against 10th rate Iraqi army
• Final DoD report on Gulf War stated: “Most casualties involved crews of armored vehicles struck by high-velocity, non-explosive tank rounds that rely on the force of impact to destroy the target.The number of deaths and injuries from these incidents would have been higher had it not been for the built-in safety and survivability features of the M-1A1 tanks and the [Bradley] fighting vehicle, such as fire suppression systems, blow out panels, hardened armor, and protective liners”

“During Desert Storm, more soldiers’ lives were saved as a result of Bradley live-fire testing than we can count.” – Army Maj Gen Peter McVey

Recommendation for Reform

• Sworn Testimony
  • Every DoD official who testifies before Congress should be required to give sworn testimony
• Open Books
  • Congress should have Pentagon’s full five-year defense program budget
• Congressional Intelligence Estimate
  • Every 2 years, Congress should pass a joint resolution assessing military threats facing the US
• Limit to “Special Access” Programs
  • All special access clearances should be revoked when a program reaches a certain spending threshold, such as $100 million.
• Defense Evaluation Board
  • Establish a formal ‘devils advocacy’ element
  • A Defense Evaluation Board could be established as a separate regulatory agency.