{"id":78,"date":"2021-03-17T17:01:09","date_gmt":"2021-03-17T21:01:09","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/danielfitzgerald.dev\/?p=78"},"modified":"2021-03-17T17:25:57","modified_gmt":"2021-03-17T21:25:57","slug":"notes-on-a-discourse-on-winning-and-losing","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/danielfitzgerald.dev\/index.php\/2021\/03\/17\/notes-on-a-discourse-on-winning-and-losing\/","title":{"rendered":"Notes on A Discourse on Winning and Losing"},"content":{"rendered":"\n<figure class=\"wp-block-embed is-type-video is-provider-youtube wp-block-embed-youtube wp-embed-aspect-16-9 wp-has-aspect-ratio\"><div class=\"wp-block-embed__wrapper\">\n<iframe loading=\"lazy\" title=\"Col. John R. Boyd&#039;s: A Discourse on Winning and Losing Lecture\" width=\"750\" height=\"422\" src=\"https:\/\/www.youtube.com\/embed\/videoseries?list=PLrRNmiSnQlT1xtCZhxil9ruqNq2h_w0p0\" frameborder=\"0\" allow=\"accelerometer; autoplay; clipboard-write; encrypted-media; gyroscope; picture-in-picture\" allowfullscreen><\/iframe>\n<\/div><\/figure>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">By John Boyd<br>YouTube link: <a href=\"https:\/\/www.youtube.com\/playlist?list=PLrRNmiSnQlT1xtCZhxil9ruqNq2h_w0p0\">https:\/\/www.youtube.com\/playlist?list=PLrRNmiSnQlT1xtCZhxil9ruqNq2h_w0p0<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<div class=\"wp-block-file\"><a href=\"https:\/\/danielfitzgerald.dev\/wp-content\/uploads\/2021\/03\/PatternsofConflictTranscript.pdf\">PatternsofConflictTranscript<\/a><a href=\"https:\/\/danielfitzgerald.dev\/wp-content\/uploads\/2021\/03\/PatternsofConflictTranscript.pdf\" class=\"wp-block-file__button\" download>Download<\/a><\/div>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Note: This is a work in progress. These notes were hastily taken while listening to the brief linked above.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>These notes are mainly from the transcript of Boyd giving the lecture to Marine Corps University students.<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Also see: <a href=\"https:\/\/www.airuniversity.af.edu\/Portals\/10\/AUPress\/Books\/B_0151_Boyd_Discourse_Winning_Losing.pdf\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\">https:\/\/www.airuniversity.af.edu\/Portals\/10\/AUPress\/Books\/B_0151_Boyd_Discourse_Winning_Losing.pdf<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<h1 class=\"wp-block-heading\">Patterns of Conflict<\/h1>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>[Tape 1 Side 1]<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">\u201c\u2026 the increasingly abstract discussion surfaces reaching across many perspectives; pulling each and every one apart (analysis), all the while intuitively looking for those parts of the disassembled perspectives which naturally interconnect with one another to form a higher order, more general elaboration (synthesis) of what is taking place.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">\u201c I\u2019ve showed there are two things you have to be able to do: analyze and synthesize.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Analysis and synthesis. And if you can do that in many different areas, tactics, strategies, goals,<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">unifying theme, you can run businesses, you can do any goddamn thing you want. And so when<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">a person calls you an analyst, you\u2019re really only a half-wit. You only got half. Idiot. So there\u2019s<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">two things that I don\u2019t like being called, one an analyst, and the other is an expert. Because an<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">expert means he knows everything and can\u2019t learn anything new. He\u2019s rigid. And boy, if you\u2019re<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">an analytical expert, you\u2019re really in deep trouble.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">\u201c&#8230; what you\u2019re trying to find out if we\u2019re going to talk about conflict, you want to reach back, you want to find out those things we call the \u201cinvariants,\u201d the constancies, or what the physicists like to call the symmetries. Where you can look at things from different points of view, and you keep seeing the same thing popping out.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">\u201cTerrain does not fight wars. Machines don\u2019t fight wars. People do it and they use their minds. So you better understand the people, because if you don\u2019t understand them, you ain\u2019t going to make it, period. Now it doesn\u2019t mean you don\u2019t pay attention to terrain, you don\u2019t pay attention to<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">machines but: person, the human being, and the people are what counts. Top and foremost<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">priority. The terrain is just the means through which you operate. The machines are just tools that you use. All they are.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">\u201cThe 25-Year War\u201d by Bruce Palmer and \u201cThe Army and Vietnam\u201d by Andrew Krepinevich.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Looked at it from 2 different angles but came to a similar conclusion.&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">We didn\u2019t understand our adversary<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">We didn\u2019t understand ourselves (inferred, not stated directly)<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">We didn\u2019t understand the tactics. In terms of strategy, we didn\u2019t understand the strategy.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">We didn\u2019t understand the nature of that war.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Need to talk about it otherwise we won\u2019t learn and our adversaries will beat us the same old way.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Wellington at Waterloo \u201cNapoleon came on the same old way, and we beat him the same old way.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">\u201cI might add, this is not patterns of war, it\u2019s not patterns of maneuver, or patterns, it\u2019s patterns of<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">conflict. We look at it in different ways. It\u2019s not \u201cpattern\u201d, it\u2019s \u201cpatterns\u201d.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">\u201cIf you\u2019re going use this for checklists, [unintelligible] matter of fact, some guys, they wanted to use this as a sort of a checklist, I say, \u201cI got a recommendation for you\u201d. He says, \u201cwhat?\u201d I say: \u201cburn the son of a bitch.\u201d\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">\u201cNapoleon said: the moral is to the physical as three is to one\u201d \u201cthe point is the moral is much more important than the physical\u201d \u201c that\u2019s where you\u2019re going to gain enormous leverage on<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">your adversary\u201c Not only do we want to understand the physical, the mental, and the moral, but how they interplay with one another.&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">you can think of the tactics as being the means toward the strategic end<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">[26:30]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">\u201cSo they know they want to get in there fast and get out. Need a hard turn for a very short period<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">of time, add it back on the energy, take it off, put it on, whatever the case may be. So they can<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">get their leverage, and knock out the adversary. So what does this suggest? It suggests something like what I call \u201cfast transients\u201d. Today we\u2019ll call it \u201cagility,\u201d\u201c<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">\u201cThink of it in space and time. In space, you\u2019re trying to stay inside his<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">maneuver; in time, you want to do it over a very short period of time, otherwise you\u2019re going to<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">become vulnerable to somebody else.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">How can we generalize this?<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">\u201cin<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">order to win we should operate at a faster tempo or rhythm in a very general sense over our<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">adversary. Or pinning it down. Or better yet, get inside what I call observation-orientation-decision-action time cycle or loop\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>OODA Explanation<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">\u201cIt doesn\u2019t make any difference whether you\u2019re a Russian, you\u2019re an Englishman, an American,<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Chinese or what. You have to observe what the hell\u2019s going on here. Then you have to, as a<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">result of that, looking at the world, you generate images, views, and impressions in your mind.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">That\u2019s what you call orientation. Then as a result of those images, views, and impressions,<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">you\u2019re going have to make a selection, what you\u2019re going to do or what you\u2019re going to do, that\u2019s<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">a decision. And then you\u2019re going to have to implement or take the action. Then you\u2019re going to<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">have to observe the consequences of that action, plus you\u2019re dragging peripheral information all<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">the time, and roll back through that loop again.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">\u201cwe want to get inside his OODA loop, not him inside ours<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Why? Very simple. If we can do that, in a sense we at that point become unpredictable to him, we become ambiguous, hence unpredictable. We generate confusion and disorder in our adversary. Why is that the case? Because he\u2019s going to be generating mental images or impressions that don\u2019t match up to that continually, what, unfolding environment. They don\u2019t match up. \u201c<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">\u201cwe\u2019re deliberately trying to generate a mismatch between that which he observes<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">and what\u2019s really going on out there. He can\u2019t keep up. Because it generates confusion. Because as he tries to get that mental event, we shift to a new event, new event, new event, so as he falls back further and further and gets more and more out of tune with his environment\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">\u201cSo the key idea, what you want to do is generate a mismatch between that which he perceives<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">and that which he must react or adapt to. Note the key word: mismatch.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">\u201cAll I have to do is be faster than my adversary. I can be slow as long as I slow his<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">down even more. So if I\u2019m slow, as long as he\u2019s slower, so it just doesn\u2019t have to speed. It can be ambiguity, deception, many other things you can do.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">F-86 vs MiG-15 story @ [35:00]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">\u201cWhat it means is that intuitive feeling, you can just see into things and know what\u2019s going<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">on. It\u2019s what we call instinctive or intuitive feel but then you\u2019re talking about battlefield feel.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">They call it fingerspitzengef\u00fchl.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">\u201cThat\u2019s right, it\u2019s always people. Machines don\u2019t fight wars, terrain doesn\u2019t fight wars,<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">people do and they use their what? Minds. So you keep track of that all the time. So if you got<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">their minds, or you get inside the other guy\u2019s mind, you pull his socks down. He gets inside<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">yours, he pulls your socks down. \u201c<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">[40:30]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">\u201cwhat are you trying to do? Compress the time over which you can<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">do these things. You want to compress your time for doing it. Turning the argument around,<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">inhibit his capacity to adapt to such an environment, cloud and distort his observations,<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">orientation, decision, all the kinds of things you can do to him. In other words you want to<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">stretch out his time, take him longer than you.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">\u201cwhen people have doubts and uncertainties, and then they start transmitting<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">those doubts and uncertainties to one another, it begins to well up into what? Confusion,<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">disorder, panic, and chaos. Groups start coming apart. \u201c<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">\u201cthe implication is clear: life is conflict, survival, and conquest\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">[End of Tape 1 Side 1]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>[Tape 1 Side 2]<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">[<a href=\"https:\/\/www.youtube.com\/watch?v=ahsu2zVrydA&amp;list=PLrRNmiSnQlT1xtCZhxil9ruqNq2h_w0p0&amp;index=2\">https:\/\/www.youtube.com\/watch?v=ahsu2zVrydA&amp;list=PLrRNmiSnQlT1xtCZhxil9ruqNq2h_w0p0&amp;index=2<\/a>]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">\u201cKurt Goedel. He said you cannot determine the consistency of system within itself, or you can\u2019t determine the character and nature of a system within itself. So you just can\u2019t understand military history by only looking at military history. You got to look at related kinds of things too.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Cant have just one strategic thinker as your model. Need to find those invariants that criss-cross among many of their ideas.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">\u201cLet\u2019s assume we don\u2019t have variety and rapidity, what\u2019s that mean? It means you can\u2019t adapt and you become predictable. And in conflict that\u2019s the worst position to be in, where you can\u2019t adapt and you\u2019re predictable\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">\u201charmonize your activities. So you can have focus, you can have direction, you can gain leverage. If everybody wanders off by themselves, all you\u2019ve got is mass entropy, or internal friction. The whole thing comes unglued and you\u2019ll be scarfed up as individuals. So without it, you\u2019re going get leveraged by other people who know how to cooperate. You\u2019ll be isolated\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Initiative: \u201cthe ability to think and take action without being urged\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">\u201c very important qualities: variety, rapidity, harmony, and initiative\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Story: \u201cEverybody wants the perfect maneuver, there are no perfect maneuvers. In fact, I remember when I was out in Nellis in the 50s, guys had this so called \u201clast ditch\u201d maneuver, but what if that doesn\u2019t work? What are you going to do, die? You\u2019ve got your favorite maneuver, it didn\u2019t work. I said, Christ, that\u2019s narrow, guys, you better have a repertoire of maneuvers. If that didn\u2019t hammer him, you pull the son of a bitch apart. So if you only got one thing you can do and the guy gets wise, that\u2019s the end of the line for you, if he gets wise. It\u2019s over. You\u2019ve been had\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">[Slide 13 7:20]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>Sun Tzu<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">\u201cIn his very first chapter, what is he talking about? The citizens have to be in accord with the, the subjects have to be in accord with the rulers of the state, you have to be in harmony with the rulers. In other words, if you can\u2019t get the people working with the rulers, you can\u2019t go to war. As a matter of fact, that\u2019s what the Vietnamese did to us. They got us so we weren\u2019t in accord with one another, and we had to depart from that war in Vietnam.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">\u201cwhat I call fluidity of action. Remember he said an army should behave like water going downhill, seeking the crevices, avoids the gaps, and strength against weakness.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Fluidity of action: Strength against weakness, paths of least resistance, adaptability<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">\u201cSo we take all these together, harmony, deception, swiftness of action, fluidity, then with those four together, you can play the so-called dispersion\/concentration game. \u201c<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">We have concentration as a principle of war but not dispersion. Sun Tzu had both.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Example: \u201cHow would you like to take a bunch of guys, nice and concentrated, and attack against a machine gun? It\u2019d clean your ass out. It\u2019s concentrated. You say, wait a minute. I want to spread them out a little bit. Yeah. So what about that? You know, we say, well, we got a caveat; when you keep caveating the principle of concentration, pretty soon there\u2019s no meaning.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">\u201cby playing all these together, you can generate what I call surprise and shock. Too often we treat surprise as input and shock as input. [10:00] I don\u2019t surprise you, you don\u2019t surprise me. I do certain things, you can\u2019t keep up. You become surprised. Surprise is an output, not an input. It\u2019s a reaction, because you couldn\u2019t keep up, you didn\u2019t pay attention, whatever the case may be. Or you\u2019re overwhelmed by what has happened. \u201c<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">\u201c shock is just a hard form of surprise, it\u2019s also an output\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">\u201cKnow your enemy. Any way you can. As a result of that, then you can shape his perception of the world, so you can manipulate his plans and actions, or his strategy and tactics. Or undermine his plans, undermine his strategy.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">\u201c attack enemy\u2019s plans is the best policy. Or attack his strategy is the best policy. Next best is disrupt his alliances &#8230; Split him up, another variation of strength against weakness. Third best is attack his army. In any case, before you attack his army, you want to do all the other things, because then you put the army in what? A weakened condition, so it comes unglued. And then attack cities only when there\u2019s no alternative.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">\u201c cheng\/chi maneuvers, as the basis of throwing your strength against his weaknesses\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">\u201cCheng is the ordinary, chi is the extraordinary. You can also think of cheng as being the direct, and chi as being the indirect. Cheng is being the obvious, chi is being the hidden. More in that sense: Cheng being the deception, chi is being the surprise.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">\u201cWhat\u2019s the virtue of multiple thrusts?\u201d \u201cWhat if everybody goes up in the line together?\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">\u201cIif the whole line moves forward, how can you get at the other guy\u2019s flank? You\u2019re just going push his line back. He says, we\u2019re going to attack his flank. No, all you do is just push him back and have casualties. &#8230; wait a minute, you got a flank too, you\u2019re trying to get at his flank. That\u2019s right. It\u2019s true you got a flank. It\u2019s not that you\u2019re trying to get at a flank, the key thing is an exposed flank. If I got a tempo or rhythm faster than my adversary, and I\u2019m penetrating, he doesn\u2019t know where the flanks are, you do, you\u2019re carving him up, he can\u2019t carve you up. The issue\u2019s not flanks, exposed flanks are the issue. And so if you have a lot of ambiguity and deception, you\u2019re running on through there, you\u2019re going pull him apart. Go look at the German campaigns or Russian campaigns, et cetera, all those thrusts that are going in there. And then look at the reaction of the people: they come unglued, they don\u2019t know what the hell\u2019s going on. Very powerful.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Montgomery forced D-Day to have 5 thrusts instead of 3.&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">\u201cMore and more ambiguity in the adversary\u2019s mind of what\u2019s going on. You slow down his tempo to respond to 24 that correctly, even on the spot\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">[Slide 14 18:05]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">\u201c the western commanders were more directly concerned with winning the battle, while the eastern commanders were closer to Sun Tzu, in that they wanted to have their adversary shattered even prior to the battle so they came totally unglued\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">\u201cthe light troops, in a sense, in some sense sometimes they\u2019re acting as a cheng, and the heavy troops are the chi. Or it swings back the other way, see it right down here. You\u2019re combining operations. [unintelligible] Use one, so when a guy tries to defend himself against one, he sets himself up against the other.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Sun Tzu: \u201che who tries to prepare and reinforce everywhere, is everywhere weak\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">He now goes over historical battles to show the principles of concentration and dispersion&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Key idea: \u201cIf you can operate at a faster tempo than your adversary, you can play the dispersion\/concentration game at its widest possible sense. If you operate slower, you\u2019re going to have to get concentrated, because otherwise you\u2019re going to get torn to ribbons. \u201c<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>Why Clausewitz is wrong<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Book eight, chapter nine<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Clauswitz \u201csays act with the utmost concentration, and later on he says it\u2019s the highest possible principle. Maybe that why we got it as a principle of war, because it came out of Clausewitz. But then when he goes into the discussion, he shows four exceptions on the idea of concentration. [30:00] Four exceptions! Well, if it\u2019s the highest principle, then why do you have an exception? Not only that, when he talks about speed, there\u2019s no exceptions. He says act with the utmost speed, act with utmost concentration. But concentration\u2019s the highest principle. And then when you read between the lines of concentration, if you can operate fast you don\u2019t require to be concentrated. If that\u2019s the case, then the premier idea\u2019s speed, not concentration. Because with speed, you can play the dispersion\/concentration game; in fact, you use it in order to concentrate on your adversary. So where in our principles of war do we have the principle of speed? Not there.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">\u201c that\u2019s why if you could set up a tempo or pace faster than your adversary, run these multiple thrusts in there, you can get at the other guy\u2019s exposed flank, so they are exposed, he can\u2019t figure out what you\u2019re up to, so you\u2019re pulling his socks down and he\u2019s not pulling your socks down\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">\u201cWell, if he finds out he can\u2019t violate speed but he can violate concentration, tells me that speed is the highest principle. So that\u2019s an internal contradiction in his own goddamn treatise.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">&#8212;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">\u201cThat doesn\u2019t mean you don\u2019t operate concentrated sometimes. Remember, I said you could blend cheng and chi. And of course that was part of the argument. I tend to use the word \u201cfocus\u201d rather than \u201cconcentration\u201d because I think concentration has too much excess baggage.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">\u201cOne thing you want to do, you want to know your adversary; if you use terror, you also may tend to actually goddamn build up his resolve and cause you big problems then too. In other words, you unify him against you. So if you\u2019re going to use that terror, you better understand how you\u2019re going to use it. Will it really pull him apart, or is it going unify him against you? \u201c<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">[35:00]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">He discusses terror at this point and may lead to an interesting discussion on our laws\/rules or maybe even Gitmo<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">[Slide 30 40:00]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">\u201cyou\u2019re not trying to deceive\u2014 you want him to know that you don\u2019t know where you\u2019re going. That\u2019s ambiguity. It\u2019s ambiguous. That\u2019s one of the things in multiple thrusts, you\u2019re generating ambiguity. You got all kinds of impressions in his mind. We\u2019ll point out later on, mental friction or mental entropy. It\u2019s why he can\u2019t cope.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">[Slide 33] which is Slide 50 in the Air University PDF<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>[Tape 2 Side 1]<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">\u201ccarry out a general, rather than a regulated mission. If I have a general rather than a regulated, what does that provide me? It allows you to be adaptable. If you\u2019re regulated, you\u2019re non-adaptable. With that adaptability then, then you can go after the chink in your foe\u2019s armor, in other words strength against weakness\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>Boyd\u2019s War against \u201csynchronization\u201d<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">\u201ceverybody\u2019s seen the Army Field Manual 100-5? \u201cSynchronization.\u201d How in the hell do you synchronize human beings? Remember, they\u2019ve got those four things up front: depth, synchronization, agility, and initiative. Agility and initiative are good. Depth, there\u2019s nothing wrong with it, except it\u2019s in the wrong part of the manual, it should be in the back, getting lower with agility and initiative. Synchronization\u2019s a disaster. You don\u2019t synchronize human beings, you synchronize watches. If harmony is higher, then they should use harmony instead of synchronization. Synchronization is part of harmony, but harmony is not necessarily part of synchronization. In other words, harmony is a more general term. It\u2019s a mistake. So they still, goddamn it, haven\u2019t learned their lesson yet. Then they say, \u201cwell, we didn\u2019t mean it.\u201d I said, \u201cthen take it out! Then why is it in there?\u201d Not only that, it doesn\u2019t fit with initiative or agility. Initiative and agility are human terms, synchronization\u2019s a mechanical term. Now do machines fight a war, or human beings? Remember, they\u2019re putting up front their philosophy. I\u2019ll tell them right to their face, it\u2019s bullshit. You got to learn how to use that noodle. If they want, they can put something else up here, okay, but you know, it doesn\u2019t go alongside. You don\u2019t synchronize human beings. That\u2019s not saying you shouldn\u2019t synchronize watches, I\u2019m not against that. Once in a while, you want a very tight synchronization with the artillery coming in on a time, on target, or something like that, but you don\u2019t synchronize human beings. You want to talk about artillery, synchronizing watches or something like that. If you use the word \u201charmony,\u201d you can use the word \u201csynchronization\u201d later on and guess what, it\u2019s in accord with harmony because it\u2019s a subset of harmony, but it\u2019s not all of harmony. They got to get that through their goddamn heads! Synchronization\u2019s a subset of harmony, doesn\u2019t mean you shouldn\u2019t have it, but it\u2019s a subset, it does not go for human beings. Anybody who tells they\u2019re going to synchronize me, I get personally irritated.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>Patton on not micromanaging<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">\u201cI want him to use harmony, he can put the synchronization down in a subset. You can\u2019t know everything of what his troops are going do. Otherwise you\u2019re going go against the very\u2014 what he\u2019s going do is lay down what he wants done. They\u2019re going determine how it\u2019s going be carried out. He\u2019s not going know the infinite details, if he tries to get in there, he\u2019s going screw up the operation, period. We\u2019ve done that over and over again. I guess these generals, I don\u2019t know what the hell they\u2019re thinking about, because they ran a platoon one time, twenty years earlier, I guess they still want to fight at the platoon level. Did you know Patton criticized his guy? He told a colonel, \u201cgoddamn it, I don\u2019t want you to interfere with their tactics. You just tell them what they\u2019re supposed to do, and they\u2019re going do it, and that\u2019s your jo. Be sure they get the resources,\u201d he told his colonels. Quote. He said, \u201call you\u2019re going do is muck it up.\u201d He understood that. Can\u2019t say he wasn\u2019t a successful commander.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Why it happened or where it would be ok:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">\u201c the point I\u2019m trying to bring out with the advent of nuclear weapons and also the communications: boy they didn\u2019t want some guy flinging off nuclear weapons, so they had very tight control, because it\u2019s an awesome weapon. And they should. But you shouldn\u2019t\u2014 because you have it at nuclear weapons, you want to have it at all other levels. Once again, that\u2019s a rigidity of mind.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>How to give an order<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">\u201c if you want to give an order, you can always give an order. What you want to do is, you want to tell somebody what you expect. Let them determine how it\u2019s going to be carried out. You should also tell them why you want it done. You know, so they can see that 38 there\u2019s a reason for it, not some goddamn bullshit in itself. And then you should put in, also, let them determine how, what, why, determine how. And then you should put in whatever constraints that you want, because remember, you\u2019re probably going deposit this thing in a larger context, and if they start doing anything they want, it can cause you some problems. So you should put constraints. Unfortunately, what we do is make the constraints so goddamn narrow, the guy can only do one thing, so therefore he\u2019s got no freedom of action.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>Story about following the checklist<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">\u201cI\u2019ll give you a good example of when I was overseas, of how they wanted me to do it. I was initially \u2026 sent over to Task Force Alpha. You probably know that was the old sensor program, &#8230;&nbsp; In any case, over in southeast Asia. In any case, one night\u2014 eventually they made me base commander. They went through seven base commander in two years. They said, \u201cBoyd, you got to clean it up there.\u201d I didn\u2019t want the job, hell I don\u2019t want this goddamn, but I had to take it over. Well, one night I\u2019d been there for\u2014 hell, I didn\u2019t even know what my responsibilities were, so\u2014a couple of our electric goons, those spy C-47s crashed, listening and ELINT13 gear and all that on there [unintelligible]. Of course, guys are out there in areas where there might be guerrillas and that, those people sent us some choppers. So the guy says, \u201cyou\u2019re the commander on the spot.\u201d Now I hadn\u2019t been there too long. I said \u201cI am?\u201d He says, \u201cyeah, okay let\u2019s go down.\u201d And he said, \u201chere\u2019s your checklist.\u201d I goddamn near fell over. I said, \u201cwhat do you mean, checklist?\u201d I took that goddamn thing and threw it, it went out the window. I said, \u201cnow where\u2019s a map, let\u2019s find out where they are, and let\u2019s start making some decisions.\u201d The guy brought the checklist back in, and I threw it back out the goddamn window. Some captain. I said, \u201cyou can\u2019t operate this way.\u201d They don\u2019t know, you know, I said, \u201cif I read this, those guys\u2019 will die of starvation out there before we get to them.\u201d So I said, \u201cnow where\u2019s the map?\u201d I said, \u201cget that goddamn thing out. You point where they are.\u201d They said, \u201cWe don\u2019t know.\u201d I said, \u201cWho knows?\u201d He said, \u201cwe\u2019ll find out. We\u2019re on that.\u201d I said, \u201cfine. What resources do we have available?\u201d I\u2019m going to take the choppers out there, then we found out we don\u2019t have enough choppers, so they had a [unintelligible] They said, \u201cYeah, but these guys got to go first.\u201d Fuck that, I don\u2019t care. I said, \u201cWhat is the situation out there?\u201d [15:00] So I reversed the whole order, and sent the choppers out and everything else. And he kept bringing the checklist back. I said, \u201cI don\u2019t give a goddamn to hell you\u2019re [unintelligible] you bring it back in here again.\u201d He said\u2014 you know, as the new guy. I didn\u2019t know what the hell I was doing. I got them all out. Blew up the two goons. You know, we had to blow them up because security [unintelligible] we got them all in there. I didn\u2019t go by any goddamn checklist. I said, you know, what do you have, went down my way, and did things that had to be done. If I started reading a checklist, hell, [unintelligible]. That\u2019s bullshit. Of course, I\u2019m a fighter pilot, I think that way. It\u2019s just like he\u2019s a fighter pilot back here, every year. I think they maybe still had it when I was there. They had this huge book. You got to sign about all the regulations that you\u2019ve signed it, and so if you violate it, they can hand you your ass. Well, nobody ever reads the son of a bitch, they just signed it and walk out the door and said \u201cyeah, I read the son of a bitch.\u201d That\u2019s a huge deception.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Napoleon<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">-Emphasized the conduct of war from the top down.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">-Strategic success to gain grand tactical success then tactical success<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">-He had scheme in his mind his marshals didnt know. Since they didnt know they had to do what he wanted. Got more rigid as you go down.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">-Result: Strategic maneuvers, ambiguous and deceiving prior to tactical concentration. After they were stereotyped and obvious.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">\u201cSo the Napoleonic Spirit, strategic fog followed by stereotyped and ruinous tactical assault.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Clausewitz<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">\u201cWe\u2019ve all heard him say war\u2019s an instrument of policy. Anybody see anything wrong with that? The military\u2019s an instrument of policy. When you say something\u2019s an instrument, what are you really inferring? You\u2019ve got control over it. In other words, you\u2019ve got\u2014 you know, a tool or an instrument, you\u2019ve got control of it. But you can\u2019t control war.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">\u201cuncertainty of information acts as an impediment to vigorous activity\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">\u201che brings in very strongly the importance of psychological and moral forces and effects, since we\u2019re talking about animate objects. Danger being one of them. Intelligence. Here he\u2019s talking about not an intelligence service but mental intelligence and emotional factors. Emotional factors, courage, confidence. Fear, anxiety, alienation, being the negative ones. Courage, confidence, and esprit being the positive ones. They can go either way, either impede or stimulate, in fact, depending upon the circumstances.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">\u201c He takes all the interaction of all these things and lumps them under the notion of friction. The interaction of many of these factors, including all those above. And because that\u2019s all very complex, that tends to, what, impede activity.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">\u201cAnybody remember his famous statement? \u201cFriction is the only concept\u201d\u2014I\u2019m quoting him now\u2014\u201cis the only concept that more or less corresponds with those factors that distinguish real war from war on paper.\u201d The point is, if you haven&#8217;t accounted for friction, you&#8217;re not talking about real war. And he\u2019s quite right, if you think about it. Because the way he looks at friction, you read it very carefully. He treats it almost the same way we treat the modern\u2014 the way we look at the second law of thermodynamics. Entropy.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">What he\u2019s trying to do is overcome his own internal friction.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">\u201c Clausewitz overemphasized the decisive battle and underemphasized strategic maneuver\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">\u201cAlso, he emphasized method and routine at the tactical level. Why did he do it? His own words, to reduce his own internal friction. Is there anything wrong with that? He wasn\u2019t looking outward. He was always looking at things in an absolute sense. \u201c<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">\u201cClausewitz is concerned with trying to overcome or reduce friction and uncertainty. He failed to address if you want to try to magnify adversary\u2019s friction and uncertainty. The point is, if you have routine in your own services and become predictable, you\u2019ve also lowered your adversary\u2019s friction relative to you. You\u2019ve got to think of it both ways. \u201c<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">\u201cAnd he incorrectly stated, \u201ca center of gravity,\u201d quoting him, \u201cis always found where the mass is concentrated most densely.\u201d That\u2019s not always true. In a donut, the center of gravity, well, there is no mass. In a hollow steel ball, it\u2019s where the steel isn\u2019t. In a dumbbell, it\u2019s in the connection between the mass. You can come up with counterexample after counterexample. It\u2019s not correct. \u201c<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Clausewitz \u201cDid not see that many non-cooperative conflicting centers of gravity paralyze adversary by denying him the opportunity to operate in a directed fashion, hence impede vigorous activity and magnify friction. [30:00] That\u2019s the game the guerrillas play to the hilt. \u201c<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>Vulnerabilities vs center of gravity<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Boyd talks about how vulnerabilities is a better term than center of gravity.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">\u201cRemember, as a matter of fact, Sun Tzu said it. \u2026&nbsp; seize that which is the vulnerability, seize that which your adversary holds dear or values most highly. Then he will conform to your desires. That\u2019s a vulnerability. He said that, Sun Tzu back 400, 500. Seize that which your adversary holds dear and values most highly. Then he will conform to your desires.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">\u201cyou want to go after your adversary\u2019s weakness, strength against weakness. You may not know that exactly. One way of finding out, though, is multiple thrusts. Because some are going to get hung up. Some will leak through. The ones that are leaking through, you know they\u2019re doing it. So then you can shift your schwerpunkt and ram it home through those. In other words, you&#8217;re adapting to circumstances.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">\u201cYou may find a weakness and go through, but he may not be too vulnerable necessarily. But also because you\u2019ve got the weakness\u2014 because you act, then you can exploit that weakness. Then you can direct that out of that weakness and effort into his vulnerability. \u201c<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">\u201cIf you go after something that\u2019s vulnerable, a critical vulnerability, he probably knows it is too. So therefore, he\u2019s going to put a lot of forces there. Now you\u2019ve got strength going against strength. In other words, you\u2019ve got Verdun and all those battles [unintelligible]. Do you understand what I\u2019m saying? So it\u2019s sometimes better to exploit the weakness. As a result, you can get to the vulnerability.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">\u201cyou\u2019ve got to set up some kind of operation to exploit some weakness, which may not be critical. Then if you can get him to goddamn allocate toward that weakness and expose that vulnerability, there\u2019s nothing wrong in that. But you\u2019ve got to get the exposure first, otherwise you can\u2019t get to it. \u201c<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">\u201cThe mission is what has to be done. The intent is the reason behind it and usually encompasses a larger effort. \u201c<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">\u201c you\u2019ve got mission. You\u2019ve got the intent. And behind that it\u2019s more, a little bit more insidious, you\u2019ve got motive. Mission first, more specific as you like to say. Then the intent. Then the motive. So the mission is what you want done to these guys. The intent is the higher level intent behind it. And there also may be a political motive even behind that intent.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">\u201cYou\u2019ve got to lay something out ahead of time, but as it begins to unfold, you might want to change that intent too. As it unfolds a different way, say hey, I can gain leverage by this. Then you shift the schwerpunkt, you shift your intent, and tell your people why. \u201c<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">\u201c All I said is you want to get that exposed. If you don\u2019t expose that first critical vulnerability, he knows it\u2019s there. You\u2019re going to get strength going against strength\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">\u201cwhat you\u2019ve got to do is get him to expose that vulnerability by exploiting his weaknesses, whatever they are, or creating weaknesses, whatever they are.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>[Tape 2 Side 2]<\/strong><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>&#8220;&#8221;<br \/>\nTo flourish and grow in a many-sided, uncertain and<br \/>\never-changing world that surrounds us, suggests that<br \/>\nwe have to make intuitive within ourselves those many<br \/>\npractices we need to meet the exigencies of that world.<br \/>\nThe contents, hence the five sections that comprise this<br \/>\nDiscourse, unfold observations and ideas that contribute<br \/>\ntoward achieving or thwarting such an aim or purpose.<br \/>\nSpecifically:<br \/>\n\u2022 \u201cPatterns of Conflict\u201d represents a compendium of<br \/>\nideas and actions for winning and losing in a<br \/>\nhighly competitive world;<br \/>\n\u2022 \u201cOrganic Design for Command and Control\u201d surfaces the implicit arrangements that permit cooperation in complex, competitive, fast moving situations;<br \/>\n\u2022 \u201cThe Strategic Game of ? and ?\u201d emphasizes the<br \/>\nmental twists and turns we undertake to surface<br \/>\nschemes or designs for realizing our aims or purposes;<br \/>\n\u2022 \u201cDestruction and Creation\u201d lays out in abstract<br \/>\nbut graphic fashion the ways by which we evolve<br \/>\nmental concepts to comprehend and cope with<br \/>\nour environment;<br \/>\n\u2022 \u201cRevelation\u201d makes visible the metaphorical message that flows from this Discourse.<br \/>\n&#8221;&#8221;<br \/>\n&#8211; From the abstract of A Discourse on Winning and Losing<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":true,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[3,2,4],"tags":[8,7,9],"class_list":["post-78","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-boyd","category-leadership","category-warfighting","tag-boyd","tag-leadership","tag-warfighting","entry"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/danielfitzgerald.dev\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/78","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/danielfitzgerald.dev\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/danielfitzgerald.dev\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/danielfitzgerald.dev\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/danielfitzgerald.dev\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=78"}],"version-history":[{"count":2,"href":"https:\/\/danielfitzgerald.dev\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/78\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":81,"href":"https:\/\/danielfitzgerald.dev\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/78\/revisions\/81"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/danielfitzgerald.dev\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=78"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/danielfitzgerald.dev\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=78"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/danielfitzgerald.dev\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=78"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}